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GLOBALIZING STANDARD OF PATENT
PROTECTION IN WTO LAW AND POLICY OPTIONS
FOR THE LDCS: THE CONTEXT OF BANGLADESH
M. Monirul Azam*

INTRODUCTION
This Article analyzes the globalizing standard of patent protection as
adopted under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS Agreement) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
possible options for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)1 such as Bangladesh
against the experiences of Brazil, India, and South Africa with special reference
to pharmaceutical patent issues. The developed member countries of the WTO
negotiated mandatory protections for pharmaceutical products and processes in
the TRIPS Agreement on the basis that such mandatory protections will provide
the necessary incentives for continued pharmaceutical innovation. In contrast,
the developing countries and LDCs argued that enacting patent laws that comply
*

M. Monirul Azam, Ph.D, L.L.M. in IP, Department of Law, University of
Chittagong, Bangladesh, World Trade Institute, University of Bern, Switzerland and
Department of Law, Stockholm University, Sweden. The author would like to express
deep gratitude to Professor Thomas Cottier (University of Bern) for valuable comments
on the first draft of this Article and Professor Marianne Levin (Stockholm University) for
comments on the revised draft. The author is also grateful to the reviewers and editors for
their valuable comments in preparation of the final draft for publication.
1
“There are no WTO definitions of ‘developed’ or ‘developing’ countries.” Leastdeveloped Countries, Understanding the WTO: The Organization, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm (last
visited Apr. 27, 2014). “The WTO recognizes as [LDCs] those countries which have been
designated as such by the United Nations. There are currently 48 [LDCs] on the UN list,
33 of which to date have become WTO members.” Id. According to the United Nations,
LDCs are countries that exhibit the lowest indicators of socioeconomic development,
with the lowest human development index (HDI) ratings of all countries in the world. A
country is classified as an LDC if it meets three criteria based on low income (three-year
average gross national income (GNI) per capita of less than $992, which must exceed
$1,190 to leave the list), human resources weakness (based on indicators of nutrition,
health, education and adult literacy) and economic vulnerability (based on instability of
agricultural production, instability of exports of goods and services, economic importance
of non-traditional activities, merchandise export concentration, handicap of economic
smallness, and the percentage of population displaced by natural disasters). Id. However,
countries “graduate” out of the LDC classification when indicators exceed these criteria.
Id. See for details Criteria for Identification and Graduation of LDCs, UN-OHRLLS,
http://unohrlls.org/about-ldcs/criteria-for-ldcs/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2014).
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with the TRIPS Agreement may restrict production and supply of low-cost
generic medicines by their local pharmaceutical industries or by the
pharmaceutical industries in other developing countries, and hence could
increase the price of pharmaceuticals to the point that pharmaceuticals may
become inaccessible to their populations. Considering the costs and benefits of
such a system, the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement will require a
reorganization and restructuring of the intellectual property regime in the LDCs.
Given the extent of the reorganization and the restructuring required, LDCs (of
which Bangladesh is one) were granted an initial transition period until
December, 31 2005,2 which was later extended to July 1, 2013 to implement a
TRIPS-compliant intellectual property regime within their domestic
jurisdictions.3 The extension was given after a request by the LDCs as a group,
pursuant to Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. The group cited socioeconomic, administrative and financial constraints and the need to create a
viable technological base as reasons to justify the extension request. However,
the transition period did not prove to be long enough for LDCs to introduce
pharmaceutical patent protection and to take adequate measures to ensure access
2

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197, art. 65 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement],
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf (LDCs were given a
ten-year period (until 2005) in which to become TRIPS-compliant.).
3
The initial transition period for LDCs ended on December 31, 2005. Later, by a
decision of the TRIPS Council on Tuesday, November 29, 2005, LDC members as a
group were granted an extension of the transitional period for 7.5 years to apply the
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement; that is, “until 1 July 2013, or until such a date on
which they cease to be a least-developed country Member, whichever date is earlier.”
WTO COUNCIL FOR TRIPS, EXTENSION OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD UNDER ARTICLE 66.1
FOR LEAST-DEVELOPED COUNTRY MEMBERS (IP/C/40) ¶ 1 (Nov. 30, 2005), available at
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S001.aspx (search for Document
Number 05-5671). The TRIPS Council took the decision following the request by the
LDCs as a group, pursuant to Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, for a fifteen-year
extension of the transition period in order for those LDCs to be able to apply the
provisions of the Agreement. WTO COUNCIL FOR TRIPS, MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN
THE CENTRE WILLIAM RAPPARD ON 25-26 AND 28 OCTOBER, 29 NOVEMBER AND 6
DECEMBER 2005 (IP/C/M/49) ¶ 243 (Jan.
31,
2006),
available
at
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S001.aspx (search for Document
Number 06-0444). The group had cited socioeconomic, administrative and financial
constraints and the need to create a viable technological base as reasons duly motivating
the request. Id. at ¶ 245. The Decision was negotiated between LDCs and some key
developed countries during informal consultations and was adopted by the formal TRIPS
Council meeting on November 29, 2005. Id. at ¶¶ 276, 285. However, during the
consultations, several developed country members, particularly the United States, insisted
that each LDC member should request an extension on an individual basis and that
extensions would be granted on a case-by-case basis. Id. at ¶¶ 267–68.
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to medicines; therefore, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health was adopted by the WTO Ministerial Conference of 2001 in Doha
on November 14, 2001, which further extended the transitional period for LDCs
to introduce pharmaceutical patent protection to January 1, 2016.4 However,
WTO members agreed on June 11, 2013 to further extend the deadline for LDCs
until July 1, 2021 to protect IP under the TRIPS Agreement.5 It is vital for the
LDCs to utilize the transitional periods properly to update their patent law
regimes and other supporting governmental policy options so that after the
expiration of the transitional period, LDCs are able to balance pharmaceutical
innovation and access to medicines.
During the TRIPS negotiations, it was argued that the principle of a
balance of rights and obligations is required because IP owners need to
undertake certain obligations in return for the exclusive rights conferred on them
and also to allow governments to take remedial measures in the case of nonfulfilment of these obligations so that IPRs can promote industrial creativity to
benefit society in general.6 This principle was generally recognized in preexisting IP conventions and in national laws of many countries.7 “The
acceptance of this principle was aimed at assuring the access of developing
countries to modern technology, eliminating non-use, misuse or abusive use of
4
As per the Decision of the TRIPS Council to implement paragraph 7 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, LDCs shall be free to disregard
the TRIPS disciplines on patents and undisclosed information with respect to
pharmaceutical products, until 2016. See WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November
2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration],
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/
mindecl_trips_e.htm; WTO COUNCIL FOR TRIPS, EXTENSION OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD
UNDER ARTICLE 66.1 OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT FOR LEAST-DEVELOPED COUNTRY
MEMBERS FOR CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS
(IP/C/25)
(June
1,
2002),
WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/art66_1_e.htm.
5
However, this decision will not prejudice the extension of pharmaceutical patents
granted under the Doha waiver, and LDCs can seek further extensions of that period. See
WTO COUNCIL FOR TRIPS, EXTENSION OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD UNDER ARTICLE 66.1
FOR LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRY MEMBERS (IP/C/64) (June 12, 2013), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ta_docs_e/7_1_ipc64_e.pdf.
6
Negotiating Group on TRIPs, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Meeting of
Negotiating Group of 11-13 September 1989, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/15 ¶ 20
(Oct.
26,
1989),
available
at
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=
&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCsQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.wto.org%
2Fgatt_docs%2FEnglish%2FSULPDF%2F92080131.pdf&ei=XR9MU9m9AuiqyAHs0o
GQBQ&usg=AFQjCNFvdhfireMHtd-bUZ3G43ICQKeoDg&sig2=RGcwDBsTNc
_vgAHEL5_ezQ.
7
See MICHAEL BLAKENEY, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: A CONCISE GUIDE TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
PRACTICE) (1998).
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intellectual property rights, especially with a view to avoiding trade distortions,
and allowing the flexibility in the intellectual property protection for the public
interest and the developmental and technological needs of developing countries”
and LDCs.8
Therefore, the principle of balance of rights and obligations could be used
while also using other flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement. It was further
suggested that the TRIPS Agreement should take into account the application of
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) principle of securing a
balance of rights and obligations among parties.9 However, as in the case of the
principle of public interest, the application of the principle of balance of rights
and obligations was adopted with the lock of the consistency test. As worded in
TRIPS Article 8.2, any measure taken under the umbrella of this article must be
“consistent with” the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.10 Moreover, to what
extent a practice is regarded as “unreasonably” restraining trade or “adversely”
affecting the international transfer of technology, and to what extent a national
response against such practices is regarded as an appropriate measure are
ambiguous questions under this article. These unclear conditions leave room for
interpretation but, otherwise, give rise to the difficulty in applying the principle
of balance of rights and obligations. Considering the room for interpretation of
TRIPS flexibilities and practices for countries like India, Brazil and South
Africa, this Article explores possible options for Bangladesh while it complies
with the patent provisions under the TRIPS Agreement.

8
Pham Hong Quat, How to Comply with the TRIPS and WTO Law: The New
Challenges to Vietnam’s Patent Legislation from WTO Dispute Settlement Practice 42
(Dec. 2006) (unpublished dissertation, Nagoya University), available at
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CC0QFj
AA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fiprenforcement.most.gov.vn%2Fckfinder%2Fuserfiles%2Ffil
es%2FHow%2520to%2520Comply%2520with%2520the%2520TRIPS%2520and%2520
WTO%2520Law(2).pdf&ei=J5ZqU5ODPcSlyASb5ILADw&usg=AFQjCNHAkYdpepk
K9NI9D8olsQH0fvqKYQ&sig2=KLYdAQBwvA1lG--qkVLowA.
9
See Negotiating Group on TRIPs, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Meeting
of Negotiating Group of 10–21 September 1990, MTN.GNG.NG11/25 ¶ 8, available at
http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92110158.pdf.
10
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 8.2.
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Brazil, India, and South Africa used TRIPS flexibilities in different ways
to change their national patent regimes to become TRIPS compliant,11 but they
experienced some difficulties with respect to the legislative measures they
enacted.12 However, the legislative provisions were found to be within the scope
of the flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement. Bangladesh, as an LDC, faces
public health challenges including lack of access to medicine due to high cost
and in some instances inadequate supply, but Bangladesh has the potential to
become a substantial (global) producer of generic medicines. The need to
balance these competing interests (pharmaceutical innovation and access to
pharmaceuticals) highlights that there may be good grounds for Bangladesh to
11

For example, Brazil implemented a system of compulsory licensing. See Kenneth
C. Shadlen, The Politics of Patents and Drugs in Brazil and Mexico: The Industrial Bases
of Health Activism 42 J. COMP. POL., Oct. 2009, at 41. Conversely, India’s experience
was very different. India entered the WTO in 1995 and went through a long amendment
process to institute a TRIPS-compliant patent regime, which became effective on January
1, 2005. Prabhu Ram, India’s New “TRIPs-Compliant” Patent Regime: Between Drug
Patents and the Right to Health, 5 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 195, 195 (2006). The
impact of stronger intellectual patent rights created problems for the larger Indian drug
firms and greatly damaged the ability of smaller local firms to meet the rising costs of
royalties and remuneration of experienced and efficient pharmacists and other technical
people. See Stephen Barnes, Note, Pharmaceutical Patents and TRIPS: A Comparison of
India and South Africa, 91 KY. L.J. 911, 924–25 (2003).
12
For example, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO set a panel, as
requested by the United States, to go into the complaint about the patent laws of Brazil in
2001, which the United States said illegally required the local working of patents and
enabled compulsory licensing of the patent or the authorization of imports of the patented
product (parallel imports) without the authorization of the patent holder. See Brazil –
Measures Affecting Patent Protection, Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS199, WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
cases_e/ds199_e.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2014). However, due to huge public pressure
and campaigns by public-health groups, both parties negotiated it outside the DSB. See
id. Conversely, Indian patent law was challenged even in the Indian Court by an MNPC,
Novartis, claiming that it was inconsistent with some of the provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement. Rajshree Chandra, The Role of National Laws in Reconciling Constitutional
Right to Health with TRIPS Obligations: An Examination of the Glivec Patent Casein
India, in INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH-PATENT LAW AND ACCESS TO
ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 392–94 (Thomas Pogge, Matthew Rimmer, & Kim Rubenstein
eds., 2010). Another major concern is the confiscation of generic Indian medicines used
to treat illnesses such as AIDS and hypertension in several European countries, regarding
which India and Brazil complained to the WTO saying that the European Union had
wrongfully confiscated generic medicines. See Jennifer M. Freedman, India, Brazil
Complain at WTO Over EU Drug Seizures, BUSINESS WEEK (May 12, 2010),
http://web.archive.org/web/20100515054911/http://www.businessweek.com/news/201005-12/india-brazil-complain-at-wto-over-eu-drug-seizures-update3-.html (accessed by
searching http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-05-12/india-brazil-complain-at-wtoover-eu-drug-seizures-update3-.html in the Internet Archive index).
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use the Indian, Brazilian, and South African experiences as a way to guide
Bangladesh’s legislative transition to a TRIPS-compliant patent regime. It is
crucial for Bangladesh to use the experiences of Brazil, India, and South Africa
to develop IPR policies that preserve the full complement of TRIPS flexibilities.
In this regard, a comment by Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss is worth noting: “These
practices [of India, Brazil, South Africa, and other developing countries] achieve
international recognition as they are defended in international courts and put on
the agendas of international organizations.”13 Therefore, “domestic actors then
may interpret the law in a particular way that allows them to offer a new
approach that others may choose to emulate.”14 While evaluating the possible
policy options for LDCs such as Bangladesh to balance pharmaceutical
innovation and access to medicines against the experiences of Brazil, India, and
South Africa for complying with the TRIPS-compliant patent law, relevant
discussions, policies, and recommendations as formulated in the WHO have also
been indicated.
This Article explores possible legislative and governmental intervention
options for Bangladesh utilizing the experiences of Brazil, India, and to some
extent, South Africa. It also reflects on the relevant policy issues and
recommendations from the WHO. This Article uses legal doctrinal analysis,
comparative review, and field research in Bangladesh using surveys and
interviews to understand the perceptions of different stakeholders regarding
different policy options available under the TRIPS Agreement.15 The field
research in Bangladesh analyzed in-depth the situation at the Department of
Patents, Designs and Trade Marks (DPDT)16 and the Directorate General of

13
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Role of India, China, Brazil and Other Emerging
Economies in Establishing Access Norms for Intellectual Property and Intellectual
Property Lawmaking 13 (Inst. for Int’l Law and Justice, Working Paper No. 09-53,
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1442785.
14
Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAS, ACTA,
and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447, 476 (2011).
15
To encourage participation, the survey and interview participants were promised
anonymity. The author has provided as much information regarding the interview and
survey participants as possible. If you would like more information on the results of the
field study, please contact the author.
16
The present legislative regime relating to the patent and pharmaceutical industry in
Bangladesh comprises the Drugs Act 1940, the Patents and Designs Act 1911 and the
Patent and Design Rules 1933. In 2003, amendments were made to the Patents and
Designs Act 1911 to establish the Department of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks
(DPDT). DEPARTMENT OF PATENTS, DESIGNS AND TRADEMARKS (DPDT),
http://www.dpdt.gov.bd/index.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2014). The DPDT is controlled
by the Ministry of Industries and has jurisdiction to issue patents and designs. Id. The
current patent law in Bangladesh with respect to patents is largely the same as it was in
India, prior to changes in 1970.
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Drug Administration17 (DDA or DGDA)18 to understand the ongoing role of the
two important regulatory bodies during the TRIPS waiver periods and to
understand their possible role in a post-TRIPS setting.

I. LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS FOR BANGLADESH
Using the Brazilian, Indian, and South African experiences, a number of
legislative options should be considered by Bangladesh in order to introduce
TRIPS-compliant patent law to help preserve Bangladesh’s local pharmaceutical
industry and to promote innovation and access to medicine. For the purposes of
this Article, the legislative options include (i) having a high threshold for
patentability and exclusion from patentability provisions, (ii) having a best mode
patent disclosure and disclosure of origin, (iv) narrowing the scope of patent
claims, (iv) providing exceptions to product patent rights such as early working,
parallel imports, and research and experimental-use exceptions, (v) having a
strong compulsory licensing mechanism, (vi) having prior-use exceptions, (vii)
having pre-grant and post-grant oppositions (viii) making the duration of patent
protection subject to exceptions, and (ix) not adopting overprotective
enforcement provisions. Each of these options will be examined in turn.
A. High Threshold and Exclusion Clause
Under the TRIPS Agreement, patent protection must be granted for
products and processes which are new, involve an inventive step, and are
industrially applicable.19 The definition of an invention itself constitutes a key
aspect of any patent policy with implications in other areas, such as industrial
17

The Directorate of Drug Administration (DDA) was the national regulatory
authority in Bangladesh, which was established back in 1976 under Ministry of Health
and Family Welfare and empowered to regulate “Bangladesh’s 838 manufacturers of
allopathic, unani, ayurvedic, herbal, homeopathic, and biochemic manufacturers’
products.” JUDE NWOKIKE & HYE LYNN CHOI, ASSESSMENT OF THE REGULATORY
SYSTEMS AND CAPACITY OF THE DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR DRUG ADMINISTRATION IN
BANGLADESH viii (Nov. 2012). The DDA was upgraded in January 2010 to the
Directorate General of Drug Administration (DGDA). Id. at 8. It is responsible for the
production, quality, registration, safety, efficacy, import, export, and distribution of
pharmaceuticals based on the power delegated to it by the different pharmaceutical
regulations. See id.
18
Although the DDA upgraded to DGDA in 2010, most of the government
documents have yet to be replaced with the new name. Hence, this Article used DGDA
and DDA interchangeably, which does not signify any major differences between the
activities of former DDA and the new DGDA.
19
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 27.1 (emphasis added) (providing that
“patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields
of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of
industrial application”).
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and public health policies. Therefore, with countries that are net importers of
technologies, their priority should be to focus on narrowing the scope of
patentability in addition to incorporating as many exceptions as possible under
the national patent law in order to be able to develop and create a viable
technological base. This also applies in the case of pharmaceutical products.
The TRIPS Agreement did not define the criteria for patent protection;
therefore, these criteria can be interpreted and applied by member states in
accordance with their national priorities and developmental goals.20 For
example, the TRIPS Agreement “does not specify the patenting of new uses of
known products, including pharmaceutical drugs, thus allowing member
countries the possibility of rejecting these new uses for lack of novelty,
inventive step or industrial applicability.”21
The TRIPS Agreement considers novelty to mean that the invention is not
already part of an existing invention and represents an inventive step. 22
Considering the importance of having a high threshold for patentability in
countries like Bangladesh, Tony VanDuzer stated:
It is a common practice of patent owners in the pharmaceutical sector to
seek to extend the effective duration of patent protection by obtaining a
second later patent on a new mode of delivery of a patented drug (such as
capsules instead of tablets) or some other small change in a patented
product. Setting high standards for novelty and inventive step would help
to ensure that a patent on a product was not, in effect, extended by a
subsequent patent on a trivial improvement.23

Justifying the non-granting of patent for new uses or second uses, Correa stated:

20
See Mohammed El Said, The Implementation Paradox: Intellectual Property
Regulation in the Arab World, 9 J. INT’L TRADE L. & POL’Y 221, 228 (2010).
21
Id. at 229.
22
See id. Article 27.1 reads:
Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available for
any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial
application. Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65, paragraph 8 of Article 70 and
paragraph 3 of this Article, patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology
and whether products are imported or locally produced.
Id. (footnote omitted).
23
Tony VanDuzer, TRIPS and the Pharmaceutical Industry in Bangladesh: Towards
a National Strategy 33–34 (CPD Occasional Paper Series, Paper 24, 2003) (footnote
omitted),
available
at
http://www.bdresearch.org/home/attachments/article/
nArt/TRIPS_and_the_Pharmaceutical_Industry_in_Bangladesh.pdf.
See
generally
Rajnish Kumar Rai, Patentable Subject Matter Requirements: An Evaluation of Proposed
Exclusions to India’s Patent Law in Light of India’s Obligations Under the TRIPS
Agreement and Options for India, 8 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 41 (2008).
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Such an invention relating to the use of a product may be deemed as nonpatentable because it consists of the discovery of an existing property
rather than a new development, or because it falls under the exclusion
from patentability (allowed by the [TRIPS] Agreement and most national
laws) of therapeutical methods.24

It is feared that awarding protection to new uses of medicines will stifle
innovation and restrict the ability of pharmaceutical companies in the
developing countries and the LDCs to produce advanced medications needed for
eradicating local disease.25 This requirement could also block the introduction of
generics, particularly in those countries where pharmacy laws do not permit
generic substitution and/or generic prescribing.26 This will have anticompetitive
consequences and result in higher prices of medications.
In this regard, the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights,
Innovation and Public Health (CIPIH) Report provides that:
Governments should take action to avoid barriers to legitimate competition
by considering developing guidelines for patent examiners on how
properly to implement patentability criteria and, if appropriate, consider
changes to national patent legislation.27

Again, the U.K. IPRs stated that:
Most developing countries, particularly those without researchcapabilities,
should strictly exclude diagnostic, therapeutic andsurgical methods from
patentability, including new uses of known products.28

24

CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 56 (2000).
25
See CARLOS CORREA, GUIDELINES FOR THE EXAMINATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL
PATENTS: DEVELOPING A PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE – A WORKING PAPER iv–v 2006),
available
at
http://ictsd.net/downloads/2008/04/correa_pharmaceutical-patentsguidelines.pdf.
26
See id. at 1.
27
WORLD HEALTH ORG., PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION
AND PUBLIC HEALTH, 133 (2006) [hereinafter CIPIH REPORT], available at
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDMQ
FjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.who.int%2Fintellectualproperty%2Fdocuments%2Ft
hereport%2FENPublicHealthReport.pdf&ei=z2BNU9SpNsK0ygGimYHwCg&usg=AFQ
jCNEFMHubzvISAJ2rJRIBo5C30qlw5w&sig2=WsHxEMok1PvQdsL7HORqsA.
28
COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 50 (2002) [hereinafter INTEGRATING
REPORT],
available
at
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/
final_report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf. Clare Short, the then British Secretary of State for
International Development, established the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights
in May 2001. Id. at i.
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On one hand, “there is no agreed international standard of absolute novelty, and,
within limits, the developing countries may pick and choose from among the
different approaches recognized in the domestic patent laws.”29 However, the
manner of dealing with the issue of the scope of patentability differs from one
country to another because this issue heavily relies on each country’s level of
progress, development, and technological capability.
Furthermore, in addition to the flexibility awarded in drafting the
patentability criteria, the TRIPS Agreement also provides for a number of
exemptions which may be excluded from patentability. Article 27.2 of TRIPS
states:
Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within
their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to
protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or
plant life or health orto avoid serious prejudice to the environment,
provided thatsuch exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is
prohibited by their law.30

The fact that the TRIPS Agreement does not define protect ordre public and
morality gives member states additional room for flexibility.
The existing patent law of Bangladesh, the Patents and Designs Act 1911
(PDA), contains no legislative provision regarding the patentability of a
pharmaceutical product and contains no provision detailing excluded categories
of inventions. By defining thresholds for novelty so as to impose a significant
requirement for novelty, Bangladesh could ensure that trivial improvements in
technology would not receive patent protection. India adopted such an approach
when it amended its Patent Act in 2005.31 The Indian Patent Act now restricts
the scope for granting patents based on frivolous claims.32 The Indian Patent Act
2005 clarifies that an “inventive step” means a feature of an invention that
“involves technical advances as compared to the existing knowledge or having
economic significance or both.”33 It also provides a definition for
“pharmaceutical substance” as being “a new entity involving one or more
inventive steps.”34 Further, the Indian Patent Act 2005 provides that “the mere
discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result in the
enhancement of the known efficacy” is not patentable.35
29

J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under
the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 11, 30 (1997).
30
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 27.2.
31
See Reichman, supra note 29, at 93 n.62.
32
K. Gopakumar, Product Patents and Access to Medicines in India: A Critical
Review of the Implementation of TRIPS Patent Regime, 3 LAW & DEV. REV. 326, 334
n.31 (2010).
33
The Patents Act, 1970, § 2(ja), No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1970 (India).
34
Id. at § 2(ta).
35
Id. at § 3(d).
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In an attempt to ensure access to medicine, section 3(b) of the Indian
Patent Act 2005 excludes from patentability “an invention the primary or
intended use or commercial exploitation of which could be contrary to public
order or morality or which causes serious prejudice to human, animal or plant
life or health or to the environment.”36 Section 3(p) also excludes patenting of
“an invention which, in effect, is traditional knowledge or which is an
aggregation or duplication of known properties of traditionally known
component or components.”37 This provision is an attempt to avoid bio-piracy
and ensure that traditional knowledge, whether handed down or developed, is
incapable of being captured by patents. One interview participant commented
that Section 3 of the Indian Patent Act 2005 is a powerful instrument to prevent
frivolous patents and the abuse of traditional knowledge and resources in India.38
Given the absence of patentability and exclusion clauses in the existing
patent law of Bangladesh, such legislative provisions should be considered by
Bangladesh as it moves toward TRIPS compliance. Such legislative provisions
are in compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, and are justified on the basis that
limiting the availability of patents should promote competition in the local
market.39 However, in the 2010 Draft Patents and Designs Act of Bangladesh
(Draft PDA)40 there are provisions on patentable inventions41 and exclusion from
patentability. 42 Unlike the Indian patent law provisions, these provisions failed
to utilize the high threshold of patentability options effectively because they lack
a provision covering pharmaceutical substances, an exclusion clause pertaining
36
The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, § 3(b), No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005
(India).
37
Id. at § 3(p).
38
Email interview with a patent law academic in Delhi, India (Mar. 10, 2012).
39
See generally Mohammad M. Azam & Kristy Richardson, Trips Compliant Patent
Law and the Pharmaceutical Industry in Bangladesh: Challenges and Opportunities,
LAWASIA J. 141 (2010).
40
In 2001, a draft patent law was prepared by the Law Commission of Bangladesh in
consultation with WIPO. It was not considered until 2007. Meanwhile, transitional
periods for the introduction of TRIPS-compliant intellectual property law including
patent law was extended for LDCs until July 2013, and the obligation to introduce
pharmaceutical patents was extended until January 1, 2016 for LDCs. Developing
Countries’ Transition Periods, FACT SHEET: TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents,
WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/
factsheet_pharm04_e.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2014). This Draft was reviewed lightly in
2007, and it was under consideration by the Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs of
Bangladesh as the Draft Patents and Designs Act, 2010. It is translated by the Law
Commission and Ministry of Law into national language “Bangla” with little revision and
adopted a separate draft Act in “Bangla” for patents only as Bangladesh Patent Ain, 2012
(Bangladesh Patent Act, 2012). Unless this Draft is approved by the Parliament of
Bangladesh, the existing Patents and Designs Act, 1911 will remain in force.
41
Draft Patents and Designs Act, 2010 § 3, 2010 (Bangl.).
42
Id. at § 4.
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to mere improvement, and protection from abuse of traditional knowledge. The
Draft PDA tried to extend the ambit of prior art under the definition of novelty:
(2) Prior art in the case of an invention shall be taken to comprise(a) all matter, whether a product, a process, information about either, or
anything else, made available to the public anywhere in the world, by
written or oral description, by use or in any other way, at any time prior to
the filing or, as the case may be, the priority date, of the application for
patent claiming the invention.43

However, this provision may not be effective without a specific exclusion
clause; therefore, these provisions should be revised in light of the Indian Patent
Act 2005.
Local pharmaceutical companies in Bangladesh view this provision as
very important for generic producers and consumers because it will increase
competition in the local market.44 However, multinational pharmaceutical
companies (MNPCs) argue that a high threshold for patentability will exclude
local inventions from patentability, which would not benefit society.45 The
middle ground would suggest that such a provision will balance the need to
maintain and support innovation with the need for access to pharmaceuticals.
B. Best Mode Disclosure and Disclosure of the Source of Genetic Resources and
Traditional Knowledge
Because the aim of the patent regime is the disclosure of information and
spread of knowledge, a “[l]ack of sufficient disclosure may be a reason for
refusal result in the rejection of an application or invalidation of a patent.”46
Correa stresses that “[t]his requirement has particular importance in the
chemical and pharmaceutical fields to enable the reproduction of the invention
during the patent term (for instance, in the case of a compulsory license) or after
patent’s expiry.”47
Article 29 of the TRIPS Agreement requires that an applicant for a patent
disclose the invention “in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for the
invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art.”48 This “may also
require the applicant to indicate the best mode for carrying out the invention
known to the inventor at the filing date.”49
43

Id. at § 5(2).
Based on the survey data, this position has been supported by the majority of large,
medium, and small local pharmaceutical companies in Bangladesh.
45
This has been remarked by a CEO of an MNPC operating in Bangladesh.
46
Correa, supra note 26, at 4.
47
Id.
48
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 29.
49
Id.
44
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The absence of high disclosure requirements will have long-term negative
implications upon innovation, technology transfer, and the dissemination of
technology in the pharmaceutical sector in developing countries.50 It will likely
strengthen the monopolistic position of MNPCs by preventing local
pharmaceutical companies from benefiting from the disclosed technical
information and precluding efforts in research and development (R&D) based on
that information.51
Section 4(2) of the PDA in Bangladesh simply provides that “a complete
specification must particularly describe and ascertain the nature of the invention
and the manner in which the same is to be performed.”52 Bangladesh should take
advantage of Article 29 of the TRIPS Agreement by requiring disclosure of the
best known mode for carrying out the invention and also that the disclosure
enable the execution of all embodiments of the invention.
During an interview, one participant argued that, given the weakness of
the existing provisions, patent applications in Bangladesh are typically
ambiguous. Often it is difficult to ascertain a precise description of the
invention, which ultimately frustrates the objective of granting of a patent in
exchange for sufficiently disclosing the invention to contribute to technical
learning and teaching.53 One participant argued that the ultimate benefit of
disclosure of an invention is the further development of that particular invention,
which leads to increased competition in the marketplace; therefore, after the
expiry of the patent term, competitors can enter the market with more viable
options.54
Both India and Brazil have adopted the best mode disclosure approach.
Section II, Article 24 of the Brazilian Industrial Property Law provides that the
“specifications shall clearly and sufficiently describe the object, so as to permit
its reproduction by a technician versed in the subject, and shall indicate, when

50

Id.
See generally Bingbin Lu, Best Mode Disclosure for Patent Applications: An
International and Comparative Perspective, 16 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 409 (2011),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1938859_
code381567.pdf?abstractid=1938859&mirid=1.
52
Patents and Designs Act, 1911, § 4, effective Mar. 26, 1971 by virtue of the Laws
Continuation and Enforcement Order of March 25, 1971, and adaptation of Existing
Bangladesh Law Order of 1972. The Patents and Designs Act, 1911 is the same as Indian
Patents and Designs Act, 1911 (No. II of 1911 (10 Pat. & T.M. Rev. 3697)).
53
Interview with a pharmacist working in a leading local pharmaceutical company in
Bangladesh, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Mar. 3, 2009).
54
Interview with an examiner at the DPDT, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Mar. 1, 2009).
51
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applicable, the best way of doing it.”55 On the other hand, section 10(4) of the
Indian Patent Law in 1970 provides that every complete specification shall:
a.
b.

fully and particularly describe the invention and its operation or use
and the method by which it is to be performed;
disclose the best method of performing the invention which is known
to the applicant and for which he is entitled to claim protection.56

Therefore, Bangladesh should adopt a similar requirement to facilitate
innovation and the development of competing products. It is worth noting that
section 11 of the Draft PDA of Bangladesh included a provision which, in part,
requires that:
(4) Every complete specification(a) shall fully and particularly describe the invention and the method by
which it is to be performed;
(b) shall disclose the best method of performing the invention which is
known to the applicant and for which he is entitled to claim
protection.57

Adoption of this provision would help the DPDT of Bangladesh to reject patent
applications if the inventions are not sufficiently disclosed.
However, best mode disclosure does not necessarily require disclosure of
origin, and hence may not prevent abuse of genetic resources and traditional.
This led to a number of developing countries including by Brazil and India58 to
debate in the WTO the question of “whether and how patent applicants should
be obliged to disclose the origin or source of the genetic resource and traditional
knowledge used in an invention and provide evidence of prior informed consent
and benefit sharing.”59 Because TRIPS Article 29 does not specifically required
disclosure of origin, developing countries are requesting amendments to the

55

Lei No. 9.279 art. 24, de 14 de maio de 1996, Diario Oficial Da Uniao [D.O.U.] de
15.05.1996. (Braz.), translated in Brazil: Industrial Property Law, 14/05/1996, No. 9.279,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=515 (last visited Mar. 24, 2014).
56
The Patents Act, 1970, § 10(4), No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1970 (India), available
at http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_2005.pdf.
57
Draft Patents and Designs Act, 2010 § 11, 2010 (Bangl.).
58
See WTO COUNCIL FOR TRIPS, ELEMENTS OF THE OBLIGATION TO DISCLOSE THE
SOURCE AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF BIOLOGICAL RESOURCE AND/ OR TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE USED IN AN INVENTION (IP/C/W/429) 2 (Sept. 21, 2004), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/IP/C/W429.doc.
59
See WTO PUBLIC SYMPOSIUM, DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS: INCORPORATING THE
CBD PRINCIPLES IN THE TRIPS AGREEMENT ON THE ROAD TO HONG KONG ¶ 1 (Apr. 21,
2005), available at http://ictsd.org/downloads/2008/12/meeting-report.pdf.
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TRIPS Agreement to ensure that the necessary requirements are incorporated
into patent application procedures.60
On the other hand, Switzerland also made proposals relating to disclosure
of origin to the WTO/TRIPS Council,61 to the WIPO Working Group on Reform
of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT),62 and to the WIPO Intergovernmental
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore (IGC).63 In Switzerland’s opinion, “the provisions of
the TRIPS Agreement provide for adequate flexibility with regard to a formal
requirement to disclose the source. Accordingly, Switzerland does not consider
it necessary to amend the TRIPS Agreement.”64 Consequently, it can be said that
TRIPS Article 29 does not prevent the introduction of the requirement to
60
Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Developing Countries Propose TRIPS Amendment on
Disclosure, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (June 1, 2006, 1:44 PM), http://www.ipwatch.org/2006/06/01/developing-countries-propose-trips-amendment-on-disclosure/.
61
See WTO COUNCIL FOR TRIPS, ARTICLE 27.3(B), THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE CBD, AND THE PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE
(IP/C/W/400/Rev.1)
(June
18,
2003),
available
at
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/IP/C/W400R1.doc; see
also WTO COUNCIL FOR TRIPS, FURTHER OBSERVATIONS BY SWITZERLAND ON ITS
PROPOSALS REGARDING THE DECLARATION OF THE SOURCE OF GENETIC RESOURCES AND
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN PATENT APPLICATIONS (IP/C/W/433) (Nov. 25, 2004),
available
at
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDF
Documents/t/IP/C/W433.doc.
62
WORKING GROUP ON REFORM OF THE PATENT COOPERATION TREATY (PCT), WIPO,
INTERNATIONAL PATENT COOPERATION UNION, PROPOSALS BY SWITZERLAND REGARDING
THE DECLARATION OF THE S OURCE OF GENETIC RESOURCES AND TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE IN PATENT APPLICATIONS (PCT/R/WG/4/13) (May 5, 2003) available at
www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/pct/en/pct_r_wg_4/pct_r_wg_4_13.pdf; WORKING GROUP ON
REFORM OF THE PATENT COOPERATION TREATY (PCT), WIPO, INTERNATIONAL PATENT
COOPERATION UNION, PROPOSALS BY SWITZERLAND REGARDING THE DECLARATION OF
THE S OURCE OF GENETIC RESOURCES AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN P ATENT
APPLICATIONS (Doc PCT/R/WG/5/11 Rev.) (Nov. 19, 2003), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/pct/en/pct_r_wg_5/pct_r_wg_5_11_rev.pdf.
63
See WIPO INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND
GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, AND FOLKLORE, FURTHER
OBSERVATIONS BY SWITZERLAND ON ITS PROPOSALS REGARDING THE DECLARATION OF
THE S OURCE OF GENETIC RESOURCES AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN P ATENT
APPLICATIONS (WIPO/GRTKF/IC/7/INF/5) (Oct. 18, 2004), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_7/wipo_grtkf_ic_7_inf_5.pdf.
64
Felix Addor, WTO Public Symposium, ICTSD/CIEL/IDDRI/IUCN/QUNO
Dialogue on Disclosure Requirements: Incorporating the CBD Principles in the TRIPS
Agreement on the Road to Hong Kong: Switzerland’s Proposals Regarding the
Declaration of the Source of Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge in Patent
Applications and Switzerland’s Views on the Declaration of Evidence of Prior Informed
Consent and Benefit Sharing in Patent Applications 5 (Apr. 21, 2005), available at
http://www.iprsonline.org/ictsd/docs/DOO6_Addor.pdf.
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disclose the source within the national legislation.65 In the context of Bangladesh
during field studies, one participant argued that “in the absence of qualified and
experienced examiners, best mode disclosure and disclosure of origin provisions
would have little effect.”66
However, in Bangladesh, neither the existing PDA nor the Draft PDA of
2010 includes any provision on the disclosure of origin. But the Draft Patent
Law of 2012 states under section 15 that patents on genetic resources or
traditional knowledge could be granted provided that the procedure of “relevant
authority and related rules” is followed, and, before granting such patent, due
consideration must be given to the issues of public order and morality.67 But,
there is no explanation or indication in the draft law regarding “relevant
authority and rules,” and also there is no existing authority or rules in
Bangladesh that deal with the issues of genetic resources or traditional
knowledge. Therefore, Bangladesh should amend the proposed law, preferably
to include disclosure of origin as part of patent application requirement rather
than in separate provision.
In addition to high-level disclosure, limiting the scope of patent claims
may also be useful for Bangladesh.
C. Narrow the Scope of Patent Claims
In a 2003 report, Tony VanDuzer stated:
The broader the claims that an inventor can make under [a patent] law, the
wider the monopoly the inventor can obtain. Broad claims reduce the
scope for competing products in the market, whereas narrow claims create
greater opportunities for innovation and competition. National laws vary in
the nature and breadth of claims permitted. In relation to pharmaceutical
products claims can be restricted to the chemical structure or composition
of a new product. . . . The TRIPS Agreement is silent on the form of and
limits on allowable claims and so Bangladesh would be free to adopt a
patent law that requires that pharmaceutical patent claims be limited to the
precise chemical composition of the product.68

65
“A number of countries . . . have already [incorporated] disclosure of origin
requirements (in different forms and conditions) in their domestic legislation, including in
the Andean Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela), Brazil, Costa
Rica, Denmark, India, Nepal, Norway and the African Union (53 African countries).”
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS: ENSURING MUTUAL SUPPORTIVENESS BETWEEN THE WTO
TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE CBD 9 (Martha Chouchena-Rojas et al. eds., 2005).
66
Interview with an IP lawyer working as a legal adviser and practitioner at the
Supreme Court, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Dec. 27, 2009).
67
See Draft Patent Act, 2012 § 15, 2012 (Bangl.) (available only in Bangla),
available
at
http://www.moind.gov.bd/index.php?option=com_docman
&task=doc_download&gid=821&Itemid=236.
68
Tony VanDuzer, supra note 23, at 33.
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Section 4(3) of the PDA of Bangladesh provides that a specification,
whether provisional or complete, must commence with the title, and in the case
of a complete specification must end with a distinct statement of the invention
claimed.69 Based upon this provision, the law is not able to facilitate the
narrowing of coverage of pharmaceutical patents, but rather encourages
applications for broad patents. By way of comparison, Brazilian legislation
provides that “[t]he claims shall be substantiated in the specifications,
characterizing the particulars of the application, and clearly and precisely
defining the subject matter that is the object of the protection.”70 During an
interview, one participant argued that most of the pharmaceutical patents
granted in Bangladesh prior to suspension of pharmaceutical patents in 2008
were based on broad claims, which in the future may restrict the production of
generic pharmaceuticals.71 Therefore, Bangladesh should adopt provisions
similar to Brazil’s that narrow the ability to claim a pharmaceutical patent so as
to restrict patenting on broad claims. However, to encourage further
development and innovation on any patented product, additional exceptions are
necessary to facilitate generic competition and cheaper products for the
consumers. Such exceptions include early working, a research and experimental
use exception and parallel imports.
D. Provide Exceptions to Product Patent Rights
Patent rights are not absolute but rather are subject to certain limitations
and exceptions. These limitations and exceptions are often designed to foster
and promote technology transfer, to prevent the abuse of intellectual property, to
foster research and innovation, and to protect public policy priorities including
public health.
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement permits member countries to “provide
limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent.”72 This article
does not list the specific acts for which exceptions can be provided. What it says
is that such exceptions should satisfy certain conditions that do not
“unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking
account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”73 The TRIPS Agreement
does not contain any explanation of the terms “limited exceptions,”
“unreasonably conflict” or “legitimate interests” and “hence the use of this
69

The Patents and Designs Act, 1911 § 4(3), 1911 (Bangl.).
Lei No. 9.279 art. 25, de 14 de maio de 1996, Diario Oficial Da Uniao [D.O.U.] de
15.05.1996. (Braz.), translated in Brazil: Industrial Property Law, 14/05/1996, No. 9.279,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=515 (last visited Mar. 24, 2014).
71
Interview with a pharmaceutical researcher at the University of Dhaka, in Dhaka,
Bangl. (Mar. 12, 2009).
72
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 30.
73
Id.
70
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provision depends on the interpretation of these conditions.”74 There are two
exceptions used by India and Brazil in their legislative framework: (i) early
working (Bolar exceptions) and research and experimental use and (ii) parallel
importing.
E. Early Working (or Bolar Exceptions) and Research and Experimental Use
The early working exemption is commonly referred to as the “Bolar”
provision or exception, as it derives from Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar
Pharmaceutical Co.,75 which concerned the manufacturing of generic
pharmaceuticals. Bolar Pharmaceutical was the generic drug manufacturer and
Roche Products was the pharmaceutical company that made and sold Valium,
the active ingredient of which was patented.76 Before the patent expired, Bolar
used the patented chemical in experiments to determine if its generic product
was the bioequivalent to Valium, and, therefore, could obtain U.S. FDA
approval for its generic version.77 Bolar argued that its use of the patented
product was not an infringement based on the experimental use exception and
that public policy favored the availability of generic drugs immediately
following a patent’s expiration.78
“The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected Bolar’s contention
holding that the experimental use exception did not apply because Bolar
intended to sell its generic product in competition with Roche’s Valium after
patent expiration and, therefore, Bolar’s experiments had a business purpose,”
and did not qualify for the statutory exception.79 The Court recognized that any
change to the patent law needed to be made by Congress.80
Shortly after Bolar Pharmaceutical was decided, Congress passed a law
permitting the use of patented products in experiments for the purpose of
obtaining FDA approval.81 As a result of this change, exceptions for early
74
Mohammad Monirul Azam & Yacouba Sabere Mounkoro, Intellectual Property
Protection for the Pharmaceuticals: An Economic and Legal Impacts Study with Special
Reference to Bangladesh and Mali, LE GRIOT DU DEVELOPPEMENT § 7.1.2 (June 1, 2012),
http://legriotdudeveloppement.blogspot.com/2012/06/intellectual-property-protectionfor.html.
75
Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F. 2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see Anshull
Mittal, Patent Linkage in India: Current Scenario and Need for Deliberation, 15 J.
INTELL. PROP. RTS. 187, 193 (2010).
76
Bolar Pharm., 733 F.2d at 861.
77
Id. at 861–62.
78
Id. at 862.
79
Mittal, supra note 75, at 193.
80
See id.
81
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68(b)–(c), 70(b) (1994); 21
U.S.C. §§ 301, 355, 360cc (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282
(1994)).
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working gained momentum and now Bolar exceptions have been enacted in
most jurisdictions.82
Importantly, the WTO Dispute Panel upheld the use of the Bolar
exception as being in conformity with the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement
in the Canada–E.U. dispute.83 Supporting the inclusion of an early use exception,
the CIPIH Report, recommended that:
Countries should provide in national legislation for measures to encourage
generic entry on patent expiry, such as the “early working” exception, and
more generally policies that support greater competition between generics,

82

In the United States, this exemption is also technically called the § 271(e)(1)
exemption or Hatch–Waxman exemption. K. Suresh Kumar, et al., Patent Laws and
Research Exemption Imperative—Do Scientists Have Enough Freedom to Operate?, 99
CURRENT SCI. 1488, 1524 (2010). The U.S. Supreme Court considered the scope of the
Hatch–Waxman exemption in Merck v Integra. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
The Supreme Court held that the statute exempts from infringement all uses of
compounds that are reasonably related to submission of information to the government under any law regulating the manufacture, use or distribution of drugs.
In Canada, this exemption is known as the Bolar provision or Roche–Bolar
provision, named after the case Roche Products v. Bolar Pharmaceutical. In the
European Union, equivalent exemptions are allowed under the terms of EC Directives 2001/82/EC (as amended by Directive 2004/28/EC) and 2001/83/EC
(as amended by Directives 2002/98/EC, 2003/63/EC, 2004/24/EC and
2004/27/EC).
Research Exemption, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Research_exemption (last
visited Apr. 16, 2014).
83
Azam & Mounkoro, supra note 74; see also WTO, CANADA--PATENT PROTECTION
OF P HARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS (WT/DS114/R) 28 (Mar. 17, 2000), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/7428d.pdf.
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement authorizes limited exceptions to patent
rights for such things as research, prior user rights, and pre-expiration testing.
Often called the ‘research exception,’ the provision is commonly used by countries to advance science and technology by allowing researchers to use a patented invention to gain a better understanding of the technology. In addition,
countries also use the provision to allow manufacturers of generic drugs to apply for marketing and safety approval without the patent owner’s permission
and before the patent protection expires. The generic producers can then market
the drug. This practice, often called the ‘regulatory exception’ or ‘Bolar’ provision, has been upheld as conforming to the TRIPS Agreement. . . . [The Panel
also found] that manufacturing and stockpiling patented drugs prior to the exhaustion of patent protection is not a “limited exception” which can be exempted under Article 30.
Bryan Mercurio, The Impact of the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement on the
Provision of Health Services in Australia, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 1051, 1065 n.39 (2005)
(footnote and citation omitted).
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whether branded or not, as an effective way to enhance access by
improving affordability.84

In addition to the Bolar exception, the “exception for research or
experimental use of an invention also falls under the Article 30 category of
exceptions.85 This exception is extensively used in many national patent laws
around the world.86 It “allows the use of a patented product in experimentation,
for both scientific as well as commercial purposes, without the consent of the
patent holder. This exception plays a significant role in the process of
encouraging innovation, dissemination of knowledge and transfer of
technology.”87
This kind of exception is important for maintaining and developing
efficient alternatives to protect public health and to encourage innovation within
the industry. The opportunity to use patented products for R&D purposes will
enable the indigenous firms to be ready with efficient processes and use these
whenever they are permitted to do so.
The existing patent law of Bangladesh under section 21 provides for
experimental-use exceptions. However, the language and process as mentioned
in the existing PDA is so ambiguous and complicated that it will have no
positive effect. The law must be amended in a way to simplify the entry of
generic pharmaceuticals into the market. The research and experimental
provision:
is very important for generic entry. It permits generic entry soon after the
patents expire and hence allows the consumers to benefit from competition
and lower prices without delay. In the absence of it, generic companies
84

CIPIH REPORT, supra note 27, at 24.
MOHAMMED K. EL SAID, WORLD HEALTH ORG. & INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE &
SUSTAINABLE DEV., PUBLIC HEALTH RELATED TRIPS-PLUS PROVISIONS IN BILATERAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS: A POLICY GUIDE FOR NEGOTIATORS AND IMPLEMENTERS IN THE
WHO
EASTERN
MEDITERRANEAN
REGION
153
(2010),
available
at
http://applications.emro.who.int/dsaf/dsa1081.pdf. See for details, CARLOS CORREA,
INTEGRATING PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS INTO PATENT LEGISLATION IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
(2000),
available
at
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/
pdf/h2963e/h2963e.pdf.
86
Id. According to Musungu and Oh, “[n]ational laws reviewed in Latin American
and Caribbean countries all contained provisions relating to the research or experimental
use exception; in Asia, 85% of the national laws reviewed provided for this exception,
although the figure is lower in Africa at 59%.” CECILIA OH & SISULE MUSUNGU, THE USE
OF FLEXIBILITIES IN TRIPS BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES : CAN THEY PROMOTE ACCESS TO
MEDICINES? 32 (Aug. 2005), available at http://www.who.int/intellectual
property/studies/TRIPSFLEXI.pdf.
87
El Said, supra note 85; see also CHRISTOPHER GARRISON, UNCTAD-ICTSD
PROJECT ON IPRS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, EXCEPTIONS TO PATENT RIGHTS IN
DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
46,
49
(2006),
available
at
http://ictsd.org/i/publications/11716/?view=document.
85
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will have to wait till [sic] the patents actually expire before they can start
the tests necessary for getting regulatory approval.88

It will take time to get such approvals and without such an exception, “the
patentee will effectively enjoy monopoly status even though there are no legal
barriers to entry.”89 However, the Draft PDA tried to simplify the process stating
that:
[A]ny machine, apparatus or other article in respect of which the patent is
granted or any article made by the use of the process in respect of which
the patent is granted, may be made or used, and any process in respect of
which the patent is granted may be used, by any person for the sole
purpose merely of experiment or research including the imparting of
instruction to pupils.90

However, the exemption, as laid down in the Draft PDA of 2010, may not
be enough if a generic producer wants to use it for experimental purposes
leading to the collection of data to be submitted to the drug-approval authority
for the production of on-patent drugs.91 In the context of the terms of the
legislative provision itself, guidance can be sought from section 107A(a) of the
Indian Patent Act, which provides:
[A]ny act of making, constructing, using, selling or importing a patented
invention solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information required under any law for the time being in
force, in India, or in a country other than India, that regulates the
manufacture, construction, use, sale or import of any product . . .shall not
be considered as an infringement of patent rights.92

In Bangladesh there are diverging opinions within the pharmaceutical industry
regarding this. During interviews, most of the local pharmaceutical industry93
strongly supported the inclusion of this provision to allow generic producers,
whereas MNPCs94 thought this may discourage investment and technology
transfer in the pharmaceutical sector. One interview participant argued that, in
88

Azam & Mounkoro, supra note 74.
Id.
90
Draft Patents and Designs Act, 2010 § 48(c), 2010 (Bangl.).
91
See Shamnad Basheer, India’s Tryst with TRIPS: The Patents (Amendment) Act,
2005, 1 INDIAN J. L. & TECH. 15, 30 (2005), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID942680_code339749.pdf?abstractid=
764066&mirid=1.
92
The Patent (Amendment Act) 2002, § 107A(a), 2002 (India).
93
During the survey, most of the local pharmaceutical companies in Bangladesh
irrespective of size (large, medium, or small) supported this provision.
94
In the survey feedback, MNPCs did not answer this question, but during the
interview MNPCs opposed this provision and considered that, in the long term, this may
provide no benefits for Bangladesh.
89
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the absence of a research and experimental-use provision, generic producers in
Bangladesh will be restricted from experimenting with patented products.95
Arguably, the absence of a research and experimental-use provision
encourages the high pricing of pharmaceuticals when given the monopoly of a
patent holder. Therefore, the present provision in Bangladesh needs to be
extended to include a similar provision to India’s in order to facilitate generic
entry of patented drugs as early as possible after the introduction of
pharmaceutical patents in Bangladesh. As part of its transition to a TRIPScompliant regime, the legislative option of including both an early working and
a research and experimental-use exemption should be considered.
A further exemption that should be considered is the practice of
permitting parallel imports.
F. Parallel Imports
The TRIPS Agreement provides that the patent owner has the exclusive
right to prevent others not only from making, using or selling the invented
product or process in the country, but also importing the product from other
countries.96 However, this right is subject to Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement,
which deals with the principle of “exhaustion.”97 “The principle of exhaustion
states that once patentholders have sold a patented product, they cannot prohibit
the subsequent resale [or import] of that product since their rights in respect of
that market have been exhausted by the act of selling the product.”98 In regard to
patent exhaustion as it relates to parallel imports, Sudip Chaudhuri wrote:
Such imports of patented products without the consent of the patent holder
in the importing country are known as parallel imports. This is very
important in the pharmaceutical industry because the same patented
medicine is often sold at different prices in different countries and hence
parallel imports permit a country to shop around for the lowest price. The
underlying justification of allowing parallel imports is that since the
innovator has been rewarded through the first sale of the product, its patent
rights have been “exhausted” and hence it should have no say over the
subsequent re-sale.99

95

Interview with an official of a public health NGO, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Feb. 9, 2009).
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 28.1(a).
97
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 6.
98
World Health Org., Intellectual Property Protection: Impact on Public Health, 19
WHO
DRUG
INFO.
236,
240
(2005),
available
at
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s7918e/s7918e.pdf.
99
Sudip Chaudhuri, Indian Generic Companies, Affordability of Drugs and Local
Production in Africa with Special Reference to Tanzania (Open University Research
Centre on Innovation, Knowledge and Development, Working Paper No. 37, Sept. 2008),
available at http://www.open.ac.uk/ikd/documents/working-papers/ikd-working-paper37.pdf.
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Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement was further clarified by the Doha
Declaration, which provided that each country was “free to establish its own
regime for such exhaustion without challenge.”100
There are three kinds of exhaustion regimes for the purpose of parallel
imports: national, regional and international.101 The United States has adopted “a
national exhaustion principle whereby the patent owner has no control over the
product once it is placed in the domestic market;” however, the patent holder
“can exercise his rights outside the US market regarding the price and quantity
of the product.”102 In contrast, the European Union has adopted a “regional
exhaustion principle whereby the rights are exhausted within” the boundaries of
the European Union.103 By comparison, international exhaustion has no
jurisdictional limit; the rights of the patent owner are exhausted once he has sold
his product.104 International exhaustion is consistent with the objective of Article
7 of the TRIPS Agreement.105 The advantage of international exhaustion is that
developing countries can scout for lower-priced patented products anywhere in
100

Doha Declaration, supra note 4, at ¶ 5(d); Chaudhuri, supra note 99.
See generally Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, The Exhaustion of Patent Rights under
WTO Law, 32 J. WORLD TRADE 137, 137–38 (1998).
102
N. Lalitha, Doha Declaration and Public Health Issues,13 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS.
401, 404 (2008), available at http://nopr.niscair.res.in/bitstream/123456789
/2026/1/JIPR%2013(5)%20401-413.pdf.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. A submission to the World Health Organization stated:
Article 7 is a key provision that defines the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement.
It clearly establishes that the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights do not exist in a vacuum. They are supposed to benefit society as a
whole and do not aim at the mere protection of private rights” and should be
utilized in a way for “the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge; social and economic welfare; and the balance of rights and
obligations.
COUNCIL DISCUSSION ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES, TRIPS, DEVELOPING COUNTRY GROUP’S
PAPER—SUBMISSION BY THE AFRICA GROUP, BARBADOS, BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, HONDURAS, INDIA, INDONESIA, JAMAICA, PAKISTAN, PARAGUAY,
PHILIPPINES, PERU, SRI LANKA, THAILAND AND VENEZUELA (IP/C/W/296) ¶ 18 (June 19,
2001),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/paper_
develop_w296_e.htm. Therefore:
[e]ach provision of the TRIPS Agreement should be read in light of the objectives and principles set forth in Articles 7 and 8. Such an interpretation finds
support in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (concluded in Vienna
in 23, May 1969), which establishes, in Article 31, that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”
Id. at ¶ 17.
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the world.106 Research conducted in a number of countries supports this claim. In
Kenya, for example, it was found that “parallel importation reduced the price of
first-line anti-retroviral medicines to one-third of the price of the patented
version.”107
In this regard, the Report on the Commission of Intellectual Property
Rights (U.K.) stated:
Developing countries should not eliminate potential sources of low cost
imports from other developing or developed countries. In order to be an
effective pro-competitive measure in a scenario of full compliance with
TRIPS, parallel imports should be allowed whenever the patentee’s rights
have been exhausted in the foreign country. Since TRIPS allows countries
to design their own exhaustion of rights regimes (a point restated at Doha),
developing countries should aim to facilitate parallel imports in their
legislation.108

Moreover, the CIPIH Report, Recommendation 4.19, states that
“[d]eveloping countries should retain the possibilities to benefit from differential
pricing, and the ability to seek and parallel import lower priced medicines.”109
In the context of Bangladesh, one pharmaceutical market expert argued
that “international exhaustion will be of no benefit for Bangladesh; rather, it will
increase counterfeiting and low-quality medicine in the local market.”110 He also
indicated that allowing cheaper medicines from other alternative sources may
jeopardize the entire pharmaceutical market in Bangladesh with regard to the
institutional and infrastructural limitation of the DDA because it would open
flood gates of different products making it impossible for the DDA to inspect
and monitor all the possible cheaper pharmaceutical products.111 However, one
public health activist in Bangladesh argued that due to fear of counterfeiting,
one cannot shut the door to opportunities; rather, counterfeiting can be prevented
if the proper steps are taken.112 She further remarked that in the absence of
parallel imports it will create a monopoly and may threaten the adequate supply
and access to affordable pharmaceuticals.113

106

Lalitha, supra note 102.
Rohit Malpani, All Costs, No Benefits: How TRIPS-plus Intellectual Property Rules
in the US–Jordan FTA Affect Access to Medicines 11 (Oxfam Briefing Paper No. 102,
Mar. 21, 2007), available at http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/all%
20costs,%20no%20benefits.pdf.
108
INTEGRATING REPORT, supra note 28, at 52.
109
See CIPIH REPORT, supra note 27, at 124.
110
This remark was made by an official of a leading MNPC operating in Bangladesh
during an interview, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Feb. 1, 2009).
111
Id.
112
Interview with a policy analyst of an international NGO working in Bangladesh, in
Dhaka, Bangl. (Mar. 1, 2012).
113
Id.
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The PDA of Bangladesh does not contain any provisions dealing with the
legality or otherwise of parallel imports. Brazilian patent law also does not
support international exhaustion.114 However, the Indian Patent Act (under
section 107) allows parallel imports and permits the import of patented drugs at
the lowest available price in the global market (international exhaustion).
Section 107A(b) of the Indian Patent Act provides: “Importation of patented
products by any person from a person who is duly authorized under the law to
produce and sell or distribute the product, shall not be considered as an
infringement of patent rights.”115
The Draft PDA of Bangladesh (2010), section 92 included the following
provision:
Meaning of Use of Invention for Purposes of Government
(1) For the purposes of this chapter, an invention is said to be used for
the purposes of government if it is made, used, exercised or vended
for the purposes of the government or a government undertaking.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-Section
(1) of this Section:
(a) the importation, by or on behalf of the government, of any
invention being a machine, apparatus or other article covered by
a patent granted before the commencement of this Act, for the
purposes merely of its own use; and
(b) the importation, by or on behalf of the government, of any
invention being a medicine or drug covered by a patent granted
before the commencement of this Act:
(i) for the purpose merely of its own use; or
(ii) for the purpose of distribution in any dispensary, hospital or
other medical institution maintained by or on behalf of the
government or in any other dispensary, hospital or other
medical institution that the government may, having regard
to the public service that such other dispensary, hospital or
medical institution render, specify in this behalf by
notification in the Official Gazette, shall also be deemed,
for the purposes of this Chapter, to be use of such invention
for the purposes of Government.116

114
See ESTHER M. FLESCH ET AL., REPORT Q 156 IN THE NAME OF THE BRAZILIAN
GROUP: INTERNATIONAL EXHAUSTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (XXXVIIIth
World Intellectual Property Congress in Melbourne, Mar. 23–30, 2001), available at
https://www.aippi.org/download/commitees/156/GR156brazil.pdf; see also Shamnad
Basheer & Mrinalini Kochupillai, TRIPS, Patents and Parallel Imports: A Proposal for
Amendment, 2 INDIAN J. INTELL. PROP. L. 63(2009), available at
http://www.nalsar.ac.in/IJIPL/Files/Archives/Volume%202/4.pdf.
115
2005 Patent (Amendment) Act, No. 15 § 92(1), 2005 (India).
116
Draft Patens and Designs Act, 2010 § 92, 2010 (Bangl.).
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Again, Draft Patent Ain (Law) 2012 of Bangladesh included a similar
provision, which also authorized individuals to parallel import with permission
from a duly empowered authority provided the individuals comply with the rules
framed for such authorization.117
This provision is ambiguous and only allows government institutions and
duly-authorized institutions or individuals to make use of parallel imports. The
existing patent act of Bangladesh (the PDA, 1911) and also draft PDA 2010
requires a notification from duly-empowered authority or government whereas
draft patent law of 2012 requires complying with clumsy administrative rules for
obtaining permission for parallel imports. Considering the bureaucratic hurdles
and delayed procedures typically faced when making a notification or getting an
authorization, along with the dysfunctional government health services, this
provision will have no positive effect on the availability or accessibility of
cheaper generic drugs in Bangladesh; therefore, Bangladesh should permit
parallel importing by anyone based on the principle of international exhaustion
and should adopt clear and transparent procedures for granting parallel imports
within a reasonable time.
The Indian parallel-imports regime has some defects. For example:
“importation of patented products by any person from any person who is duly
authorised under the law to produce and sell or distribute the product.”118
Therefore, it may restrict the importation of cheaper drugs unless the exporter is
duly authorized by law to produce, sell, or distribute such drugs. Shamnad
Basheer explained this problem with an example: suppose India’s patent laws
prohibit production of a drug that is under a valid patent but Bangladesh’s laws
do not. These drugs are available via import from a Bangladeshi drug producer
because there is no pharmaceutical patent in Bangladesh, and, therefore, the
drug producer in Bangladesh does not need any authorization from the patent
holder.119 However, under the existing provision in India, an Indian importer
may be barred from importing from Bangladesh because of a potential violation
of Article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement120 as the goods produced in Bangladesh
by a third party did not have authorization from the patent holder, were not
distributed by the patent holder, and the patent right has not been exhausted. In
this situation, there will be complications when trying to import drugs from
cheaper sources that may also trigger unnecessary legal hurdles and litigation for
violation of the TRIPS provisions. Therefore, Basheer suggested the following
amendment to be included as section 107B, in the existing Patent Act of India:
117

Draft Patent Ain (Law), 2012 § 31, 2012 (Bangl.).
2005 Patent (Amendment) Act § 107A(b), 2005 (India).
119
Shamnad Basheer & Mrinalini Kochupillai, supra note 114, at 66–74.
120
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 28.1 (stating in a pertinent part that “a
patent owner shall have the exclusive right to prevent third parties not having the owner’s
consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these
purposes that product”).
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107B. Exhaustion of Rights
(1) For the purposes of this Act, the rights of a patentee or anyone
claiming through such patentee shall be exhausted after a patented
article has been sold once anywhere in the world (including within
India), by or with the authorization of such patentee.121

This suggestion seems to be more logical because the first sale122 of a
product anywhere in the world by the patent holder would be considered an
exhaustion of rights and, therefore, it could be imported from anyone and from
anywhere in the world. Bangladesh should use this approach when drafting its
parallel-importation to ensure access to medicine at the best possible price.
Allowing for the parallel import of pharmaceuticals may be an effective tool to
force patent holders to sell their protected pharmaceuticals at reasonable and
affordable prices.123
In addition to research exceptions and parallel imports, a strong position
within a compulsory licensing regime is important for ensuring access to
affordable medicines.
G. Strong Compulsory Licensing Mechanism
The issues of compulsory licensing were:
brought to the forefront of the international debate about intellectual
property and public health policy in January 1998, after the Executive
Board of the World Health Assembly adopted a resolution urging the
member states to put public health above commercial interests and to
review their options under TRIPS to safeguard access to essential drugs.124

While the TRIPS Agreement does not use the term “compulsory license,”
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement permits “use without authorization of the
right holder” and includes both use by third parties and government use.125 The
121

Basheer & Kochupillai, supra note 114, at 84–85.
“Exhaustion of rights, or the doctrine of first sale, is inherent to IPRs and a
necessity in bringing about legal certainty in downstream markets. Thomas Cottier, The
Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights - A Fresh Look, 39 IIC INT’L REV. INTELL.
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 755, 755 (2008).
123
See Krithpaka Boonfueng, Parallel Imports in Pharmaceuticals: Increase Access to
HIV
Drugs,
THAILAND
LAW
FORUM
(July
19,
2001),
http://www.thailawforum.com/articles/hivdrugs1.html.
124
WILLIAM W. FISHER III & CYRILL P. RIGAMONTI, THE SOUTH AFRICA AIDS
CONTROVERSY : A CASE STUDY IN PATENT LAW AND POLICY 12 (Feb. 10, 2005), available
at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/South%20Africa.pdf; see also WORLD
HEALTH ASSEMBLY EXECUTIVE BOARD RES., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, REVISED
DRUG STRATEGY (EB 101/R.24) 2 (Jan. 27, 1998), available at
http://apps.who.int/gb/archive/pdf_files/EB101/pdfangl/angr24.pdf.
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TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 31.
122

No. 2]

Globalizing Standard of Patent Protection in WTO Law and Policy
Options for the LDCs: The Context of Bangladesh

429

Doha Declaration clarified the WTO’s position on compulsory licensing by
providing that “each member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted.”126
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement dealing with compulsory licensing
does not clarify the grounds under which a compulsory license can be given.
However, as stated in another article:
[C]ertain conditions listed in the Article will have to be satisfied. These
include: (i) that authorization of such use will have to be considered on its
individual merits, (ii) that before permitting such use (except in such cases
as situations of national emergencies, extreme urgency, public noncommercial use), the proposed user will have to make efforts over a
reasonable period of time to get a voluntary license on reasonable
commercial terms, (iii) that the legal validity of the compulsory licensing
decision and the remuneration will be subject to judicial or other
independent review, and (iv) that the compulsory licenses can be
terminated if and when the circumstances which led to it cease to exist and
are unlikely to recur.127

Nevertheless, there are some “[l]ess controversial grounds for issuing
compulsory licences as contemplated in TRIPS itself” such as “[t]o correct
anticompetitive practices,” “[n]ational emergenc[ies] or other situations of
extreme urgency, including public health crises, and” “[p]ublic non-commercial
use, such as to provide health care to the poor.”128
“In all these circumstances, TRIPS Article 31 permits a Member to grant
compulsory licences without first having to make efforts to obtain a licence from
the patent owner [under] reasonable commercial terms and conditions.”129
However, even in these cases the TRIPS Agreement requires the payment of
“adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account
the economic value of the [licence].”130
In the PDA of Bangladesh, there is also a provision dealing with the issue
of compulsory licenses. Section 22 of the PDA provides:
(1) Any person interested may present a petition to the government
which shall be left at the Department of Patents, Designs and Trade
Marks, together with the prescribed fee, alleging that the demand
for a patented article in Bangladesh is not being met to an
126
127

Doha Declaration, supra note 4, at ¶ 5(b).
Azam & Mounkoro, supra note 74; see alsoTRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art.

31.
128

VanDuzer, supra note 23, at 36.
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130
Id. (quoting TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 31). For details, see Swarup
Kumar, Compulsory Licensing Provision Under TRIPS: A Study of Roche vs. Natco Case
in India vis-à-vis the Applicability of the Principle of Audi Alteram Partem, 7 SCRIPTED
135 (2010).
129
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adequate extent and on reasonable terms and praying for the grant
of a compulsory license, or, in the alternative, for the revocation of
the patent.
(2) The government shall consider the petition, and if the parties do not
come to an arrangement between themselves the government may,
as it thinks fit either dispose of the petition itself or refer it to the
High Court Division for a decision.131

As emphasized, there are some limitations within section 22 in the
context of meeting the needs of the local pharmaceutical industry and in
ensuring access to medicine. The first limitation is that the section only applies
where a situation is one of inadequacy and unreasonable terms. These terms are
not defined in the PDA so there is uncertainty as to the extent of these terms.
The second limitation is that there is no expert body to deal with a compulsory
license application; there is only a referral to the High Court Division. The third
limitation is that the section only applies to domestic need; therefore, local
generic producers in Bangladesh may not take the opportunity to export to
countries having no manufacturing capacity or countries in extreme need of
pharmaceuticals. The fourth limitation is that the section does not provide any
clear indication as to royalties or a ceiling on the royalties in the case of a
compulsory license. The absence of a clear provision on royalties may give rise
to higher claims for royalties and related litigation,132 which could arguably
create a degree of uncertainty. The fifth limitation is that the section does not
prescribe any time limit for the conclusion of the proceedings. The sixth
limitation is that the section does not provide that a compulsory license can be
issued on the grounds of public interest, a health emergency, or for public noncommercial use. Further, section 23(3) of the PDA states that “No order
revoking a patent shall be made . . . which is at variance with any treaty,
convention, arrangement or engagement with any foreign country.”133 Such a
provision may be used to prevent the issue of a compulsory license or revocation
of a patent to argue that Bangladesh is breaching the TRIPS Agreement or any
other bilateral free trade and investment agreement. Thus, patent-holders could
take advantage of the cumbersome procedure and frustrate the efforts of
interested enterprises in getting compulsory licenses. Despite having a

131

The Patents and Designs Act, 1911 § 22, 1911 (Bangl.) (emphasis added).
See generally F. M. Scherer & Jayashree Watal, Post-TRIPS Options for Access to
Patented Medicines in Developing Countries, (CMH Working Paper Series, Paper No
WG4:1,
June
2001),
available
at
http://library.cphs.chula.ac.th/Ebooks/HealthCareFinancing/WorkingPaper_WG4/WG4_
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compulsory license provision, the government of Bangladesh has never issued a
compulsory license for patented drugs.134
These limitations should be removed and the PDA amended to
incorporate a viable compulsory licensing mechanism. In this regard, the
legislative examples of India and Brazil may be useful. Both India and Brazil
have included compulsory licensing mechanisms within their legislative regime.
Such legislation has the potential to not only ensure access to medicines, but
also enable local generic producers to export and supply generic
pharmaceuticals to other poor countries, countries without manufacturing
capacity or to those in urgent need of medicines.135
Bangladesh should adopt a provision similar to the Indian provision that
permits the issue of a compulsory license in the case of a national emergency,
health crisis, or for public non-commercial use. For example, section 92(1) of
the Indian Patent Act provides:
(2) If the Central Government is satisfied, in respect of any patent in
force, in circumstances of national emergency or in circumstances of
extreme urgency or in case of public non-commercial use, that it is
necessary that compulsory licences should be granted at any time
after the sealing thereof to work the invention, it may make a
declaration to the effect, by notification in the Official Gazette . . . .136

Again to allow exportation under a compulsory license, section 92A of the
Indian Patent Act states:
(1) Compulsory licence shall be available for manufacture and export
of patented pharmaceutical products to any country having
insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical
sector for the concerned product to address public health problems,
provided compulsory licence have been granted by such country or
such country has, by notification or otherwise, allowed importation of
the patented pharmaceutical products from India.137

Bangladesh should adopt a similar provision to allow local generic
producers to exploit the opportunity to export cheap generic medicines to other
countries that have no manufacturing capacity or that are facing an extreme
health emergency. It is also interesting to note that the Indian Patent Act
includes a provision listing the prime objectives for granting a patent for
pharmaceuticals. In the event of a violation of any of these provisions, grounds
134
Interview with a deputy registrar at the Department of Patents, Designs and
Trademarks, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Mar. 7, 2012).
135
See generally CECILIA OH & SISULE MUSUNGU, THE USE OF FLEXIBILITIES IN TRIPS
BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES : CAN THEY PROMOTE ACCESS TO MEDICINES? (Aug. 2005),
available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/studies/TRIPSFLEXI.pdf.
136
The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, § 92(1), 2002 (India).
137
The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005 § 55, 2005 (India) (emphasis added).
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for the issue of a compulsory license could be raised. In this regard, section 83
of the Indian Patent Act provides:
Without prejudice to the other provisions contained in this Act, in
exercising the powers conferred by this Chapter, regard shall be had to the
following general considerations, namely:
(a) that patents are granted to encourage inventions and to secure the
Public-health Safeguards in Indian Patents Act that the inventions
are worked in India on a commercial scale and to the fullest extent
that is reasonably practicable without undue delay;
(b) that they are not granted merely to enable patentees to enjoy a
monopoly for the importation of the patented article;
(c) that the protection and enforcement of patent rights contribute to the
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers
and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to
social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and
obligations;
(d) That patents granted do not impede protection of public health
and nutrition and should act as instruments to promote public
interest, especially in sectors that are of vital importance for the
socioeconomic and technological development of India;
(e) that patents granted do not in any way prohibit Central Government
in taking measures to protect public health;
(f) that the patent right is not abused by the patentee or person deriving
title or interest on-patent from the patentee, and the patentee or a
person deriving title or interest on-patent from the patentee does not
resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely
affect the international transfer of technology; and
(g) that patents are granted to make the benefit of the patented invention
available at reasonably affordable prices to the public.138

By inserting the above section, the Indian government validated its
present actions and any future actions as a measure to protect the public interest.
In particular, sections 83(d) and (e) are adopted from the objectives and
principle clause of the TRIPS Agreement,139 which validates government actions
based upon the socioeconomic conditions of the country. Bangladesh should
adopt a similar provision as a proactive measure so that it can validate future
actions to protect the public interest and the socioeconomic interest and
developmental goals of the country.
However, commentary on the Indian compulsory licensing regime has
highlighted a limitation of the section because there is no clear detail regarding
the requirement to pay royalties. Gopakumar stated that “gaps in the law take
138
139

The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 § 39, 2002 (India) (emphasis added).
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 7–8.
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away the effectiveness of a compulsory license regime under the Patents Act. As
a result, during the last five years only one application was filed for the issuance
of a compulsory license in India.”140
In this respect, to speed up the process of issuing compulsory licenses in
the case of an emergency situation, either an administrative body should be
created to deal with the application or a provision enacted to empower the
government itself to issue a compulsory license without application. In this
respect, Article 71 of the Brazilian Industrial Property Law provides:
In cases of national emergency or of public interest, as declared in an
act of the Federal Executive Power, and provided the patentholder or his
licensee does not fulfil such need, a temporary and non-exclusive
compulsory license for exploiting the patent may be granted, ex
officio, without prejudice to the rights of the respective titleholder.141

This provision empowers the Brazilian government to issue a compulsory
license if negotiations between parties fail.142 Such a legislative option should be
considered by Bangladesh as part of its TRIPS-compliant legislative regime. In
the Draft PDA 2010, Bangladesh tried to use the Indian option, but the provision
needs clarification143 because it is not clear whether exports can be made to nonWTO member countries or those that do not have pharmaceutical patents or

140

Gopakumar K. M., Product Patents and Access to Medicines in India: A Critical
Review of the Implementation of TRIPS Patent Regime, 3 LAW & DEV. REV. 326, 341
(2010).
141
Lei No. 9.279 art. 71, de 14 de maio de 1996, Diario Oficial Da Uniao [D.O.U.] de
15.05.1996. (Braz.), translated in Brazil: Industrial Property Law, 14/05/1996, No. 9.279,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=515 (last visited Mar. 24, 2014) (emphasis
added).
142
Brazil used this provision to threaten with compulsory licenses in order to gain
substantial price reductions on several occasions. See Shanker, Daya, Fault Lines in the
World Trade Organization: An Analysis of the TRIPS Agreement and Developing
Countries (2005) (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wollongong), available at
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCsQFj
AA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fro.uow.edu.au%2Fcgi%2Fviewcontent.cgi%3Farticle%3D14
97%26context%3Dtheses&ei=m09dU6ikMur4yQH3g4Fo&usg=AFQjCNEP1wTUDCL1
2JwtBwpV-uKSL3rQEw&sig2=nucm-B0lqD76mPlNEaNASw.
143
Draft Patents and Design Act, 2010, § 84, 2010 (Bangl.).
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patents of a particular drug.144 As the law currently stands, the issue of
compulsory licenses is still determined by the courts, like in India, rather than by
any specific executive body, like in Brazil. The court procedure in Bangladesh is
overly long, costly, and complicated; therefore, this may discourage potential
applicants from applying for compulsory licenses.
In this regard, the IPR Commission in the United Kingdom stated that “an
important barrier to compulsory licensing in developing countries is the absence
of straight forward legislative and administrative procedures to put it into
effect.”145 In addition, the CIPIH Report recommended:
Countries should provide in their legislation powers to use compulsory
licensing, in accordance with the TRIPS agreement, where this power
might be useful as one of the means available to promote, inter alia,
research that is directly relevant to the specific health problems of
developing countries.146

Therefore, Bangladesh should follow the Brazilian approach of issuing
compulsory licenses and establish an expert body to deal with compulsory
licensing issues within the shortest possible time to speed up the production of
generic drugs in case of public-health crises. As the TRIPS Agreement does not
prohibit administrative decision-making on compulsory licenses and
government use of patents, establishment of an expert administrative body could
speed up the issue of compulsory licenses and could also avoid prolonged
litigation, as the legal systems in most developing countries and LDCs,
including Bangladesh, are already overburdened.
Further, the issue of reasonable remuneration is not clearly defined;
therefore, bargaining over this issue may also unnecessarily delay the procedure
of issuing compulsory licenses. In this case, Bangladesh could perhaps adopt the
Canadian approach of fixing royalties based on the United Nations’ Human

144
Although it is not clarified in the Draft Patents and Design Act 2010, the Draft
Patent Act of 2012 under section 14(18) provides that compulsory licenses can be granted
for pharmaceutical exports to countries having inadequate or no manufacturing capacity.
See Draft Patent Act, 2012 (available only in Bangla), available at
http://www.moind.gov.bd/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=8
21&Itemid=236. However, the draft law of 2012 included a separate provision in section
30 that compulsory licenses including pharmaceutical export licenses could not be
granted in Bangladesh unless the August 30th TRIPS amendment becomes effective in
Bangladesh. See id.
145
INTEGRATING REPORT, supra note 28, at 8.
146
CIPIH REPORT, supra note 27, at 176.
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Development Index (HDI)147 with a slight modification. The same formula
should be used based on ranking of the country where the manufactured drugs
under the compulsory license are to be exploited, because the Canadian model
only accounts for exports based on the destination of the drugs (the importing
country). 148 Bangladesh still holds a very low ranking in the HDI, and most of
the exporting destinations of Bangladeshi pharmaceutical products are still in the

147

“The Human Development Index (HDI) is a measure of life expectancy, literacy,
education, and standard of living for countries worldwide. It is a standard means of
measuring well-being, especially child welfare.” CENTRE FOR ENVIRONMENT EDUCATION,
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT : AN INTRODUCTION 17 (2007). It is used to determine
whether the country is a developed, a developing, or an under-developed country, and
also to measure the impact of economic policies on quality of life. Id. The origins of the
HDI are found in the annual Human Development Reports of the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP). Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, The Human Development
Paradigm: Operationalizing Sen’s Ideas on Capabilities, 9 FEMINIST ECON. 301, 303
(2003). It was devised by economist Mahabub-ul Haq in 1990 with the explicit purpose
“‘to shift the focus of development economics from national income accounting to people
centered policies.’” Id. (citation omitted). For more information, see Human Development
Index (HDI), Human Development Reports, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMME, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi (last visited Mar. 24, 2014).
148
According to James Love:
In 2005, Canada proposed royalty guidelines for the export of medicines under
the Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa Act, which implements the WTO waiver of
Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement. The Canadian royalty guidelines are a
sliding scale of the generic sales price. The rate depends entirely upon the location of the importing market and the rank of the importing country in the [United Nations Human Development Index] (UNHDI). The formula is one, plus the
number of countries on the UNHDI, minus the importing country’s rank on the
UNHDI, divided by the number of countries on the UNHDI, multiplied by
0.04. The rate is then applied to the generic sales price.
With 177 countries currently in the UNHDI index, the royalty rate can be expressed as: Royalty rate = 0.04 * [(178)–rank importing country]/177.
JAMES LOVE, REMUNERATION GUIDELINES FOR NON-VOLUNTARY USE OF A PATENT ON
MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGIES
72
(2005),
available
at
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/technical_cooperation/WHOTCM2005.1_OMS.pdf.
During the time of adoption of this royalty approach in 2004, the top rate was 4% of the
generic sales price for Norway, as it was the number one country in the HDI in 2004, and
the lowest rate was 0.02% for Sierra Leone as it was lowest ranking country in the HDI in
2004. Id. See for details MOHAMMAD MONIRUL AZAM, REVISITING THE CLIMATE CHANGE
NEGOTIATION UNDER THE UNFCCC: IN SEARCH OF EFFECTIVE FRAMEWORK FOR
NEGOTIATION
AND
TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER
(2009),
available
at
http://www.conference.unitar.org/yale/sites/conference.unitar.org.yale/files/Paper_Azam.
pdf.
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lower level of the HDI.149 With this modification, Bangladesh would be able to
produce drugs locally using compulsory licenses, or it could use compulsory
licenses for exporting by paying the minimum fixed royalties without any
cumbersome bargaining.
Furthermore, the government of Bangladesh may need to modify existing
provisions that regulate “local working” of the patent or related provisions
concerning patented products manufactured or processes used outside of
Bangladesh. Section 23 of the PDA provides that:
(1) At any time not less than four years after the date of a patent granted
under this Act, any person may apply to the Government for relief under
this section on the ground that the patented article or process is
manufactured or carried on exclusively or mainly outside Bangladesh.
(2) The Government shall consider the application, and, if after inquiry it
is satisfied(a) that the allegations contained therein are correct; and
(b) that the applicant is prepared, and is in a position, to manufacture
or carry on the patented article or process in Bangladesh; and
(c) that the patentee refuses to grant a license on reasonable terms,
then, subject to the provisions of this section, and unless the patentee
proves that the patented article or process is manufactured or carried
on to an adequate extent in Bangladesh, or gives satisfactory reasons
why the article or process is not so manufactured or carried on, the
Government may make an order
(d) revoking the patent. . . .150

The existing patent law of Bangladesh does not contain any definition of
the term “manufactured or carried on exclusively or mainly outside Bangladesh”
as mentioned in section 23 of the PDA. This absence of a definition may result
in varied and ambiguous interpretations. Again, section 23 of the PDA requires
that four years should lapse from the date of granting of a patent and only then
can one apply for the revocation of patents on the ground of “non-working in the
territory” of Bangladesh.151 Therefore, the ambiguity of the existing provision
and the four year requirement will delay the entry of cheaper local
pharmaceuticals. This will allow the MNPCs to enjoy a monopoly for their
patented pharmaceuticals without any transfer of technology and investment for
local manufacture as they will rely on the manufacturing facilities outside of

149

The ranking of Bangladesh in the HDI of 2010 was 129. UNITED NATIONS DEV.
PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010, THE REAL WEALTH OF NATIONS:
PATHWAYS
TO
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT,
145
(2010),
available
at
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/270/hdr_2010_en_complete_reprint.pdf. For
the HDI of other countries, see id. at 143–46.
150
The Patents and Designs Act, 1911 § 23, 1911 (Bangl.).
151
Id.
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Bangladesh. In this regard, section 84 of the Indian Patent Act152 and Article 68
of the Brazilian Industrial Property Act (1996)153 may be models for Bangladesh,
which so far have successfully resisted the pressure of the United States and
MNPCs.154
The Indian Controller of Patents, while disposing of an application for
compulsory license in Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Bayer Corp.,155 clarified the issue of
working of the patent in the territory of India. The Controller noted that the term
“worked in the territory of India” had not been defined in the Indian Patent Act,
and so he needed to interpret the term with regard to “various International
Conventions and Agreements in intellectual property,” the 1970 Patent Act and
the legislative history. 156 The Controller, using Article 27(1) of the TRIPS
Agreement and Article 5(1)(A) of the Paris Convention, supported an
interpretation that failure to manufacture in India supported the grant of a
compulsory license to Natco stating that: “[p]atents are not granted merely to
enable patentees to enjoy a monopoly for importation of the patented article”
and that “the grant of a patent right must contribute to the promotion of
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology.”157
152

2005 Patent (Amendment) Act § 84, 2005 (India):
Compulsory licences. –
(1) At any time after the expiration of three years from the date of the grant of a
patent, any person interested may make an application to the Controller for
grant of compulsory licence on patent on any of the following grounds, namely–
(a) that the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented
invention have not been satisfied, or (b) that the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price, or (c) that the patented invention is not worked in the territory of India.
153
Lei No. 9.279 art.68, de 14 de maio de 1996, Diario Oficial Da Uniao [D.O.U.] de
15.05.1996. (Braz.), translated in Brazil: Industrial Property Law, 14/05/1996, No. 9.279,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=515 (last visited Mar. 24, 2014):
(1) The following also occasion a compulsory license:
I. non-exploitation of the object of the patent within the Brazilian territory for
failure to manufacture or incomplete manufacture of the product, or also failure
to make full use of the patented process, except cases where this is not economically feasible, when importation shall be permitted; or
II. commercialization that does not satisfy the needs of the market.
154
See generally Daya Shanker, India, the Pharmaceutical Industry and the Validity of
TRIPS, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 315 (2002); see also Daya Shanker, Brazil,
Pharmaceutical Industry and the WTO, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 53 (2002).
155
Compulsory License Application No. 1 of 2011, Application for Compulsory
License Under Section 84(1) of the Patents Act, 1970 in Respect of Patent No. 215758,
Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Bayer Corp. (Mar. 9, 2012), available at
http://www.ipindia.nic.in/iponew/compulsory_license_12032012.pdf.
156
Id. at 39–45.
157
Id. at 43.
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Therefore, considering the experiences of India, the government of
Bangladesh may adopt the following provision on the working of the patent in
the territory of Bangladesh:
“Compulsory License for Non-Working in the territory of Bangladesh
At any time after the expiration of three years from the date of the grant of
a patent, any person interested may make an application to the Department
of Patents, Designs and Trademarks or to the duly authorised office for
grant of a compulsory license on patent on any of the following grounds,
namely –
(a) that the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the
patented invention have not been satisfied . . .
(ii) the demand for the patented article has not been met to an
adequate extent or on reasonable terms . . .
(b) that the patented invention is not available to the public at a
reasonably affordable price
(c) that the patented invention is not worked in the territory of
Bangladesh.

Explanation: This section is to be applied to the extent giving due
consideration to the fact that patents are not granted merely to enable patentees
to enjoy a monopoly for importation of the patented article, but the grant of a
patent right must contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to
the transfer and dissemination of technology.
During the interview, most of the participants argued that Bangladesh
should have strong compulsory licensing mechanisms.158 However, one
participant argued that compulsory licenses are not a viable option as they will
discourage technology transfer and foreign direct investment in Bangladesh.159
Another participant commented that the provision alone is not enough if the
procedure is complicated and results in an inordinate delay in issuance of
compulsory licenses.160 Using the experiences of India and Brazil, if Bangladesh
can include a compulsory license provision in its future amended patent law that
avoid clumsy and complicated procedures, it will help ensure access to
pharmaceuticals in the event of a public-health emergency in Bangladesh and
provide a competitive advantage to its local pharmaceutical industry when
exporting to any other country having low or no manufacturing capacity.

158

During interviews, the issues of compulsory licensing were supported by most of
the executives of local pharmaceutical companies irrespective of size (large, medium, and
small). That support was echoed by public health NGOs and local researchers.
159
Interview with a policy analyst of an MNPC operating in Bangladesh, in Dhaka,
Bangl. (Mar. 09, 2012).
160
Interview with a policy analyst of an international NGO working in Bangladesh, in
Dhaka, Bangl. (Mar. 10, 2012).
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Similarly, Bangladesh should include a prior-use exception to protect
local producers within the pharmaceutical industry.
H. Prior-use Exceptions
Considering the number of local generic producers in Bangladesh and the
magnitude of investment made in the area of cheap generics, the prior-use
exception should be incorporated into Bangladesh’s TRIPS-compliant patent
law. In a study by the World Bank, the Indian example of prior user rights is
referred to as a “Grandfather clause” or automatic compulsory license illustrated
as follows:
Generic versions of patented medicine can continue to be manufactured in
India provided that: (1) the generic manufacturer was producing and
marketing the product prior to January 1, 2005; (2) the generic
manufacturer made significant investment in the production and marketing
for the product; and, (3) a reasonable royalty is paid to the patent holder.161

During field studies in Bangladesh, a majority of the participants strongly
supported the inclusion of a prior user rights provision similar to India’s.162
However, one participant argued that this kind of provision will discourage
foreign direct investments and transfer technology in Bangladesh.163
The Indian example of prior-user rights has some weaknesses. It may be
challenged by the patent holder on a number of grounds, such as it was not
exploited prior to January 1, 2005 or prior to introduction of pharmaceutical
patents, investment is not sufficient (as there is no indication in the law, how
much investment is to be considered as sufficient), or the reasonable royalty rate
may be challenged. These weaknesses may create barriers for generic
production. In this case, the Brazilian provision should perhaps be replicated in
Bangladesh, which has no such limitations. Such an exception is contained in
Article 45 of Brazil’s Industrial Property Law and provides that:
A person who in good faith, prior to the filing or priority date of a patent
application, was exploiting the object thereof in this country, shall be

161
THE WORLD BANK, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR APPROACHES TO IMPROVING
PHARMACEUTICAL QUALITY IN BANGLADESH 15 (Mar. 2008), available at http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/09/01/00033495
5_20080901071115/Rendered/PDF/451900NWP0Box31uality0no2301PUBLIC1.pdf.
162
This has been mentioned by a number of large, medium, and small pharmaceutical
companies in Bangladesh and was also supported by officials at the patent office and
directorate general of drug administration, Bangladesh.
163
Interview with CEO of an MNPC operating in Bangladesh, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Mar.
9, 2012).
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assured the right to continue the exploitation, without onus, in the same
manner and under the same conditions as before.164

While the above legislative options go towards defining the matters of
patentability and exceptions, a provision related to patent application objection
procedure should also be included.
I. Pre-grant and Post-grant Opposition
Pre-grant and post-grant opposition “is an important way to assist and
encourage public interest groups and local generic pharmaceutical companies to
oppose attempts by others” who seek patents.165 An opposition provision is
currently contained in Bangladesh under section 9(1) of the PDA, which
provides:
Any person may, on payment of the prescribed fee, at any time within four
months from the date of the advertisement of the acceptance of an
application, give notice at the Department of Patents, Designs and Trade
Marks of opposition to the grant of the patent on any of the following
grounds, namely:
(a) that the applicant obtained the invention from him, or from a person
of whom he is the legal representative or assign; or
(b) that the invention has been claimed in any specification filed in
Bangladesh which is or will be of prior date to the patent, the grant of
which is opposed; or
(c) that the nature of the invention or the manner in which it is to be
performed is not sufficiently or fairly described and ascertained in the
specifications; or
(d) that the invention has been publicly used in any part of Bangladesh or
has been made publicly known in any part of Bangladesh; or
(e) that the complete specification describes or claims an invention other
than that described in the provisional specification, and that such
other invention either forms the subject of an application made by the
opponent for a patent, which if granted would bear a date in the
interval between the date of the application and the leaving of the
complete specification, or has been made available to the public by
publication in any document published in Bangladesh in that interval;
but on no other ground.166

164

Lei No. 9.279 art. 45, de 14 de maio de 1996, Diario Oficial Da Uniao [D.O.U.] de
15.05.1996. (Braz.), translated in Brazil: Industrial Property Law, 14/05/1996, No. 9.279,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=515 (last visited Mar. 24, 2014).
165
Mohammad Azam & Kristy Richardson, Pharmaceutical Patent Protection and
Trips Challenges for Bangladesh: An Appraisal of Bangladesh’s Patent Office and
Department of Drug Administration, 22 BOND L. REV. 1, 8 (2010).
166
The Patents and Designs Act, 1911 § 9(1)), 1911 (Bangl.) (emphasis added).
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As emphasized above and in a study by Azam and Richardson, objections
to the provision are limited by two conditions. The first limitation “is that the
objection must be made within four months of the advertisement of the
acceptance of the application.”167 The second limitation is that the objection can
only be based on the grounds provided by section 9(1).168 It further stated that
“[i]f defects in the patent application are revealed, or identified after the four
month period, no objection can be raised against the patent application. In other
words, the existing legislative regime does not permit any type of post-grant
opposition.”169 “This is in contrast to the legislative equivalent in India which
not only contains eleven grounds for pre-grant opposition but also permits postgrant opposition.”170
“The Indian grounds for post-grant opposition are broad enough to
challenge novelty, inventive steps and the process of industrial application, best
method, claims and disclosure of origin and even the use of indigenous or local
knowledge.”171 Given this comparison, it is suggested that the existing
Bangladeshi provision is not sufficient and should be amended to include more
extensive pre-grant heads of objection as well as a process for post-grant
opposition.
In taking such a legislative step it is further suggested “that the heads of
objection should be as wide as possible so that the twin aims of ensuring access
to medicine with the aim of promoting innovation within the pharmaceutical
industry are not hampered.”172 During field studies in Bangladesh, a majority of
the participants opined that the Indian example of pre-grant and post-grant
opposition may need to be replicated in Bangladesh.173 But, one participant
argued that the local pharmaceutical industry and public health organizations in
Bangladesh lack adequate expertise and resources to effectively exploit pregrant and post-grant opposition; therefore, they should prepare themselves to use
the proposed provision for pre-grant and post-grant opposition effectively. 174
Another participant also criticized that there is no accessible online information
about ongoing patent applications in Bangladesh and that even a paper copy of
DPDT’s journal is not distributed regularly; therefore, interested parties will
167

Azam & Richardson, supra note 165, at 8.
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 8 n.31.
171
Id.; see also Archana Shanker & Neeti Wilson, The Patent Opposition System in
India,
IAM
MAGAZINE
14
(July
8,
2010),
http://www.iammagazine.com/issues/article.ashx?g=4ed76a24-e544-4547-a651-84c0542aecd1.
172
Azam & Richardson, supra note 165, at 8–9.
173
During interviews, this view was echoed by most of the officials of large, medium,
and small pharmaceutical companies in Bangladesh and also supported by local IP
academics and public health NGOs.
174
Interview with IP academic at the University of Chittagong, in Chittagong, Bangl.
(Mar. 5, 2012).
168
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have extreme difficulties in collecting the required information to oppose any
patent application or granted patent.175 Therefore, simply having this provision
may not be enough unless access to information regarding patent applications
and granted patents is regularly updated and available for review by interested
parties. One participant in the interview argued that this provision may open the
flood gates to unnecessary opposition and may even frustrate investments in the
pharmaceutical sector.176
The issue of how long a patent should last also needs consideration.
J. Duration of Patent Protection
Under section 14 of the PDA of Bangladesh, patent protection is available
for sixteen years. The TRIPS Agreement requires that patent protection be
available for twenty years. The Brazilian Industrial property law simply
indicates that patent protection shall be for twenty years from the date of
filing.177 Indian Patent law extends the duration to twenty years subject to the
patent legislation in India, and that duration is to be counted from the date of
filing:
Subject to the provisions of this Act, the term of every patent granted, after
the commencement of the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, and the term
of every patent which has not expired and has not ceased to have effect, on
the date of such commencement, under this Act, shall be twenty years
from the date of filing of the application for the patent.178

While the TRIPS Agreement limits the ability of Bangladesh to explicitly
reduce a patent period, the legislative amendment should contain a qualification.
To that extent, it is suggested that while amending the PDA to be TRIPS
compliant, Bangladesh could include that the “duration of protection is subject
to exceptions as included in this Act or to be included by any future
amendments.” Such an extension may provide the government with some
freedom to act as times change and TRIPS compliance is assessed. It will also
permit the government to act immediately in case of a health emergency or to
act because of some other type of public interest. During the interview, some
participants considered this kind of reservation to be useful to limit patent

175

Id.
Interview with CEO of an MNPC operating in Bangladesh, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Mar.
7, 2012).
177
Lei No. 9.279 art. 40, de 14 de maio de 1996, Diario Oficial Da Uniao [D.O.U.] de
15.05.1996. (Braz.), translated in Brazil: Industrial Property Law, 14/05/1996, No. 9.279,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=515 (last visited Mar. 24, 2014) (“An
invention patent shall remain in force for a period of 20 (twenty) years, and a utility
model patent for a period of 15 (fifteen) years from the date of filing.”).
178
2005 Patent (Amendment) Act, § 53(1), 2005 (India).
176
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protection, if necessary, on public interest grounds.179 However, one participant
argued that limiting patent protection will discourage investment in the
pharmaceutical sector; rather, he argued that twenty years is not sufficient to
recover investment and that the duration should be extended to thirty years in
the pharmaceutical sector.180
The United States and the European Union (as insisted and supported by
their MNPCs), while negotiating bilateral investment agreements with the
developing countries and the LDCs, including Bangladesh, insisted on the
inclusion of extended periods for pharmaceutical patents beyond twenty years in
order to compensate the originator of the drug for the time lost during the patent
application and drug registration procedures.181 The United States and the
European Union considered this a legitimate right which must be granted in
order to “compensate” its pharmaceutical companies for any “unreasonable”
delays throughout the patent examination or the registration process.182
But “[t]he costs of patent term extension are grave.”183 For example, “a
recent study in the Republic of Korea concluded that the extension of patent
terms is likely to cost the Korean National Health Insurance Corporation . . .
504.5 billion won (US $529 million) for extending drug patents for three years
and 722.5 billion won (US $757 million) if it has to agree to a four-year
extension as proposed under [Free Trade Agreement] negotiations with the
United States.”184
The TRIPS Agreement “is clear regarding this term of protection. It does
not specify that a member state is obliged to extend the patent protection term
for any reason (including delays in registering drugs or issuing patents) beyond
the term prescribed under Article 33.”185
In this regard, the CIPIH Report stated that “[b]ilateral trade agreements
should not seek to incorporate TRIPS-plus protection in ways that may reduce
179
From interview data (this has been supported by many large, medium, and small
local pharmaceutical companies in Bangladesh).
180
Interview with executive of a MNPC operating in Bangladesh, in Dhaka, Bangl.
(Mar. 9, 2012).
181
See Emily Jones, Signing Away the Future: How Trade and Investment Agreements
Between Rich and Poor Countries Undermine Development (Oxfam Briefing Paper No.
101, March 2007), available at http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/
files/Signing%20Away%20the%20Future.pdf.
182
Id.
183
El Said, supra note 85, at 145.
184
Id.; see also U.S. FTA May Cost Drug Industry $1.2 Billion: Gov’t, THE
HANKYOREH
(Oct.
17,
2006),
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_business/165065.html.
185
El Said, supra note 85, at 144; see INT’L CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE
DEV., RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT (2005). It should be noted that
patent term extensions were proposed by the developed countries and rejected by the
developing countries during the Uruguay Round.
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access to medicines in developing countries.”186 Therefore, LDCs such as
Bangladesh should not adopt patent term extension under the patent regime and
should not agree in any future FTAs for patent terms beyond the TRIPS
Agreement. Again, the government of Bangladesh needs to craft enforcement
provisions in a way so as not to become a barrier to the production and supply of
generic drugs.
K. Not to Adopt Overprotective Enforcement Provisions
LDCs such as Bangladesh should be aware that the TRIPS Agreement
only sets minimum requirements with respect to enforcement of IPRs. However,
there has been an increased focus on strengthening mechanisms for enforcement
of IPRs far beyond what is required by the TRIPS agreement through so called
“anti-counterfeiting” initiatives.187 The developing countries and LDCs are
increasingly under pressure to place criminal sanctions on a wide array of IPR
violations, including patent infringement.188 But placing criminal sanctions on

186

CIPIH REPORT, supra note 27, at 182.
See generally GLOBAL COMM’N ON HIV AND THE LAW, REGIONAL ISSUES BRIEF:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 22 (Feb. 17, 2011),
available at http://www.ippacificislands.org/health/IssuesBrief_IPR.pdf. For example:
In 2008, Kenya enacted its Anti-Counterfeit Act, purportedly designed to address the problem of counterfeit goods, including substandard and spurious
medicines. It attached harsh criminal sanctions related to counterfeiting. However, according to the definition of the Act safe, effective and legitimate generic medicines were also considered “counterfeit.” By conflating the issues of
safety, quality and efficacy, and the separate field of intellectual property, the
Act potentially criminalized the manufacture, import, export, possession or sale
of perfectly safe generic medicines. Kenya’s Anti-Counterfeit Act was challenged before the High Court in July 2009 by three petitioners living with HIV
on the basis that impinges on their constitutional right to health. The Court
passed preliminary judgment in favour of petitioners on 23 April, 2010 and
suspended powers of Anti-Counterfeit Agency to interfere with importation and
distribution of generics pending ruling on the substance.
UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE: IMPROVING ACCESS TO
TREATMENT BY UTILIZING PUBLIC HEALTH FLEXIBILITIES IN THE WTO TRIPS AGREEMENT
47
(2010)
[hereinafter
GOOD
PRACTICE
GUIDE],
available
at
http://content.undp.org/go/cms-service/stream/asset/?asset_id=3259443.
188
See generally Ermias Biadgleng & Viviana Tellez, The Changing Structure and
Governance of Intellectual Property Enforcement (S. Ctr. Research Paper No. 15, Jan.
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1210622; Susan
Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy Enforcement
Efforts: The State of Play (Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. L. Prog. Info. Justice & Intell. Prop.,
PIJIP
Research
Paper
Series.
No.
15,
2010),
available
at
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/research/15/.
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patent infringement (e.g., considering generic medicines “counterfeit”189) can
restrict access to medicines and, therefore, “could have a chilling effect on
generic manufacturers’ willingness to enter the market with affordably priced
generic medicines.”190
On the other hand, “overbroad powers granted to customs officials, have
already been used to hinder the legitimate trade of affordable generic medicines”
under the pretext of counterfeiting and infringement.191 For example, in 2009,
Dutch authorities seized a shipment in transit of the generic drug Abacavir
produced in India, purchased by UNITAID192 and on its way to Africa, on
grounds that the generic version of the medicine violated patent rights in
Europe.193
The use of the term “counterfeit” medicines became further controversial
when the WHO-IMPACT meeting in December2008 suggested that a medical
product is counterfeit when there is a false representation in relation to its
identity, history or source, its container, packaging or other labeling
189

See generally CARLOS CORREA, CENTRE FOR INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES ON
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMICS, THE PUSH FOR STRONGER ENFORCEMENT RULES:
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2007); Michael Blakeney, International
Proposals for the Criminal Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: International
Concern with Counterfeiting and Piracy, INTELL. PROP. Q. 1 (2009).
190
UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 187, at 46.
191
Id.; see Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan & Thomas Jaeger, Policing Patents
Worldwide? EC Border Measures Against Transiting Generic Drugs Under EC and
WTO Intellectual Property Regimes, 40 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 502
(2009); see also JENNIFER BRANT WITH ROHIT MALPANI, OXFAM INT’L, EYE ON THE BALL
MEDICINE REGULATION—NOT IP ENFORCEMENT—CAN BEST DELIVER QUALITY
MEDICINES
(Feb.
2,
2011),
available
at
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/eye-on-the-ball-medicine-regulation020211-en.pdf.
192
UNITAID is the first global health organization that “uses innovative financing to
increase funding for greater access to treatments and diagnostics for HIV/AIDS, malaria
and tuberculosis in low-income countries.” About Unitaid, UNITAID,
http://www.unitaid.eu/en/who/about-unitaid (last visited Apr. 20, 2014). It is “[b]ased in
Geneva and hosted by the World Health Organization, approximately half of UNITAID’s
finances come from a levy on air tickets.” Id. It “was established in 2006 by the
governments of Brazil, Chile, France, Norway and the United Kingdom as the
‘International Drug Purchasing Facility.’” Id. It is now backed by an expanding northsouth membership, including Cyprus, Korea, Luxembourg, Spain, Cameroon, Congo,
Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius and Niger along with philanthropic organization
like the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Id.
193
See Frederick M. Abbott, Seizure of Generic Pharmaceuticals in Transit Based on
Allegations of Patent Infringement: A Threat to International Trade, Development and
Public Welfare, 1 WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. J. 43, 47 (2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1535521_code157668.pdf?abstractid
=1535521&mirid=1.
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information.194 On the other hand, the 66th meeting of the WHO Regional
Committee for South East Asia rejected the WHO-IMPACT definition of
counterfeit drugs. Recognizing the need to separate IP issues from quality and
safe medical products, the draft resolution urged member countries to refrain
from IP enforcement that compromises access to medicines.195 In this regard, the
Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance (IPA) argues that the references to “history” and
“source” in the WHO-IMPACT definition suggest patent infringement and that
this might affect exports of generics (from India) because it wrongly leads the
public to believe that generics are counterfeits.196 Therefore, India requested the
original WHO definition of counterfeit medicines be maintained:
A counterfeit medicine is one which is deliberately and fraudulently
mislabeled with respect to identity and/or source. Counterfeiting can apply
to both branded and generic products and counterfeit products may include
products with the correct ingredients or with the wrong ingredients,
without active ingredients, with insufficient active ingredients or with fake
packaging.197

194

IMPACT, SUMMARY REPORT FOR THIRD IMPACT GENERAL MEETING (Dec. 2–5,
2008),
available
at
http://www.who.int/impact/resources/IMPACT
thirdgeneralmeeting_report.pdf?ua=1.IMPACT (International Medical Products AntiCounterfeiting Taskforce) is a global coalition of all stakeholders including NGOs,
enforcement agencies, pharmaceutical manufacturers associations, and drug and
regulatory authorities. More information is available at WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/impact/about/en/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2014).
195
For details, see N. Lalitha, Access to Indian Generic Drugs: Emerging Issues, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PHARMACEUTICALS AND PUBLIC HEALTH: ACCESS TO DRUGS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 225–52 (Kenneth C. Shadlen, S. Guennif & N. Lalitha, eds.,
2011).
196
See New Counterfeit Definition a Threat to Generics, Says India, SCRIP
INTELLIGENCE (May 30, 2008), http://www.scripintelligence.com/home/news/Newcounterfeit-definition-a-threat-to-generics-says-India-56036.
197
See General Information on Counterfeit Medicines, Medicines, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, http://www.who.int/medicines/services/counterfeit/overview/en/ (last
visited Mar. 24, 2014).
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However, the TRIPS Agreement does not require the criminalization of
patent infringement, and it limits criminalization obligations to a limited class of
wilful trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy on a commercial scale.198
Neither Brazil nor India has adopted any overprotective enforcement
mechanisms that could criminalize generic production and supply. Therefore,
while instituting TRIPS-compliant enforcement obligations within domestic
patent law and pharmaceutical regulations, the government of Bangladesh,
rather than adopting overprotective provisions that would hamper supply of
generic medicines, should focus on efforts to strengthen drug regulatory
authorities, promote rational use and public awareness not to sell, buy, or
distribute any fake or counterfeit medicines, and avoid not defining the
counterfeiting of medicines so as to include patent infringement.
Apart from the above legislative options, the government of Bangladesh
should consider some additional interventions to ensure access to medicines and
to promote pharmaceutical innovation in the process of moving towards a
TRIPS-compliant regime.

II.

GOVERNMENT-INTERVENTION OPTIONS

Although the patenting of pharmaceuticals and consequent impact on
pharmaceutical price is not the only issue affecting access, it is considered a
significant barrier and one that is common to all developing countries, whatever
their stage of development.199 That is why, during the interviews in Bangladesh,
most of the participants echoed that simply using the flexibilities available in the
TRIPS Agreement when drafting national patent laws will not improve access to
medicines in Bangladesh, especially when the country’s economic development,
health infrastructure, drug distribution, and drug availability is in disarray. 200
There is also fear that achievements made thus far through the local production
198

See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 61. It states:
Members shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied at
least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale. Remedies available shall include imprisonment and/or monetary
fines sufficient to provide a deterrent, consistently with the level of penalties
applied for crimes of a corresponding gravity. In appropriate cases, remedies
available shall also include the seizure, forfeiture and destruction of the infringing goods and of any materials and implements the predominant use of which
has been in the commission of the offence. Members may provide for criminal
procedures and penalties to be applied in other cases of infringement of intellectual property rights, in particular where they are committed wilfully and on a
commercial scale.
Id. (emphasis added).
199
See Access to HIV/AIDS Treatment in Developing Countries, INTERAGENCY
COALITION ON AIDS AND DEVELOPMENT (Aug. 2001), http://www.icad-cisd.com.
200
Interview with officials at the Directorate General for Drug Administration in
Bangladesh and Public Health NGOs, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Mar. 12-15, 2012).
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of pharmaceuticals will not continue if MNPCs and developed countries put
pressure on Bangladesh to refrain from producing and exporting cheaper generic
drugs that compete with the more expensive patented brands produced by the
MNPCs.201
However, MNPCs and developed countries like the United States and the
European Union are not yet pressuring Bangladesh for pharmaceutical patents.
As an LDC, Bangladesh still can waive compliance with the pharmaceutical
patents of the TRIPS Agreement. Additionally, Bangladesh is not a competitive
threat yet because it is not a country that promises huge profits.202 Some critics
consider that, “[d]espite having 125 million people, the average wage, life
expectancy, and literacy rates are among the lowest in the world,” and its local
pharmaceutical industry is incapable of making the raw materials for new drugs;
hence, MNPCs are not interested in putting any pressure on Bangladesh.203 In
1997, the U.S. Embassy in Bangladesh reported: “Intellectual property
infringement is common, but is currently of relatively limited significance for
US firms.”204 According to Oxfam, “[t]his attitude may change soon, as it has
happened in other poor countries such as Ghana and Uganda, where
multinational companies have already acted to stop them importing cheaper
generic drugs, which compete with the more expensive patented brands of
medicine.”205 Therefore, apart from reforming patent law, Bangladesh may need
to consider some other alternative governmental-intervention options to ensure
access to medicines.206
Supporting alternative measures apart from market-based instruments, Dr.
Zafarullah Chowdhury remarked that:
Medicines are one commodity you can’t leave to market forces. The
market is simply not competent. . . It makes for monopolies and cartels,
not competition. And every drug is, by definition, essential. If you have a
malfunctioning liver and only one drug can save your life, that to you is
the most essential drug in the world. Allowing the global drug market to
be controlled by foreign firms (with lengthy periods of patent control) is
not going to help us.207

201

See OXFAM GB, MAKE VITAL MEDICINES AVAILABLE FOR POOR PEOPLE :
BANGLADESH
5–6
(Feb.
8,
2001),
available
at
http://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/oxfam/bitstream/10546/112437/1/bangaldeshmedicines-poor-080201-en.pdf.
202
See generally id. at 8.
203
Id. at 4.
204
Id. at 5.
205
Id.
206
Email interview with a patent law academic in New Delhi, India (Mar. 11, 2012).
207
OXFAM GB, supra note 201, at 6.
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Dr. Chowdhury further added that “[l]ocal drug firms have no innovative
technology, therefore when Bangladesh is bound to honour foreign patents on
new drugs ‘that could be our collapse.’”208
Another renowned public-health activist in Bangladesh, Farhad Mazahar,
remarked that “[t]he impact [of pharmaceutical patents] on Bangladesh will be
huge because most of our raw materials [for new and existing drugs] come from
India. . . . Our companies are only pharmacies, really [not the pharmaceutical
industry itself].”209 Therefore, considering the delicate infrastructure of the
public-health situation, the low level of access to medicines, and lack of
innovation among the local pharmaceutical industries in Bangladesh, it is
suggested that Bangladesh may adopt some alternative measures using the
examples of Brazil, India, and South Africa, which are: (i) drug price control;
(ii) national competition law; (iii) the introduction of the patent prize system;
(iv) limiting data protection; (v) developing a patent pool on country specific
diseases; (vi) avoiding TRIPS-plus requirements in any future bilateral
investment agreements (BITs) or under Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with the
developed countries more particularly with the United States and the European
Union; (vii) lobbying for the further extension of the transitional period for
pharmaceutical patents; (viii) introducing process patents only for limited
periods and adopting a utility model law; and (ix) instituting the Special
Investment Protection Regime, an open source drug innovation, and the Social
Business Model in the pharmaceutical sector.
A. Drug Price Control
Affordability of medicines by individual patients in the LDCs is an
important factor influencing access to care and treatment.210 However, control
over the cost of medicines exists in one form or another in most countries. For
example, in Australia, “new drugs with no advantage over existing products are
offered at the same price.”211 “Where clinical trials show superiority,
incremental cost effectiveness is assessed to determine whether a product

208

Id.
Id.
210
See generally DRUGS AND MONEY : PRICES, AFFORDABILITY AND COST
CONTAINMENT (M.N.G. Dukes et al. eds., 7th ed. 2003), available at
http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/96446/e79122.pdf.
211
Amit Sen Gupta, Should Drug Prices Be Controlled?, ECONOMIC TIMES (Aug. 6,
2002),
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2002-0806/news/27340990_1_drug-prices-price-controls-drug-companies.
209

450

Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

[Vol. 13

represents value for money at the price sought.”212 In the United Kingdom, the
pharmaceutical price-regulation scheme (PPRS), a voluntary agreement between
the United Kingdom’s Department of Health and the Association of the British
Pharmaceutical Industry exists so that companies negotiate profit rates from
sales of drugs to the National Health Service (NHS).213 In France, Italy, and
Belgium, prices are set in relation to the relative cost and the contribution made
to the national economy. 214
In Bangladesh, there is no drug price-control mechanism under the
existing Patent Act. However, the Drug Control Ordinance of 1982 provides for
the fixing of prices by a committee appointed by the government.215 The
committee mostly deals with essential medicines, as listed by the DGDA in
Bangladesh. Accordingly, no such listed drugs can be circulated without such
pricing controls.216
This is a vital guarantee that the prices of pharmaceuticals, whether
produced nationally or imported from the outside, will not increase without prior
government authorization.217 Further, it is within the government’s purview to
refuse the registration of any pharmaceuticals that are regarded as too expensive
or unaffordable.218
In 1982, 150 pharmaceuticals were defined as essential pharmaceuticals219
and any changes to prices were decided by the Drug Control Committee.
212

JAN SWASTHYA ABHIYAN, NAT’L COORDINATION COMM., ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL
MEDICINES
37
(Feb.
2007),
available
at
http://www.healthpolicy.cn/rdfx/jbywzd/gjjy2/yd/yjwx/201002/P0201002275720146599
49.pdf. See generally JON SUSSEX, KOONAL K SHAH & JIM BUTLER, CONSULTING REPORT
10/2: THE PUBLICLY FUNDED VACCINES M ARKET IN AUSTRALIA (Oct. 2010).
213
The PPRS regulates profits to a band of 17 to 21 % on historic capital or the initial
capital used to begin the venture with a 25% variation on either side. Companies are free
to set prices, provided the rate of return is within the band. If the profits are higher, the
companies have to reduce profits the next year and if the profits are lower, they can raise
their prices. For details, see KEVIN A HASSETT, PRICE CONTROLS AND THE EVOLUTION OF
PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETS, COMM. ON INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC
HEALTH
(July
22,
2004),
available
at
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/news/en/Submission-Hassett.pdf.
214
See Alan Maynard & Karen Bloor, Dilemmas in Regulation of the Market for
Pharmaceuticals, 22 HEALTH AFFAIRS 31, 37 (May/June 2003).
215
See Azam & Richardson, supra note 39.
216
See ULRIKE POKORSKI DA CUNHA, STUDY ON THE VIABILITY OF HIGH QUALITY
DRUGS
MANUFACTURING
IN
BANGLADESH
7
(2007),
available
at
http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/Services/PSD/BEP/en-high-quality-drugsbangladesh-2007.pdf.
217
No drug can be introduced into the market without prior approval from the Drug
Control Committee and price fixation by the Drug Price Committee as per Drugs
(Control) Ordinance, 1982 § 9(2)), 1982 (Bangl.).
218
Drugs (Control) Ordinance, 1982, § 6(1) (Bangl.).
219
See DA CUNHA, supra note 216.
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However, since 1993, the number of price-controlled pharmaceuticals has
reduced to 117 primary health-care pharmaceuticals.220 The Drug Control
Ordinance 1982 has empowered the government to determine the maximum
retail price (MRP) of 117 essential drug-chemical substances. The MRP is
broken down into trade price (75.5%), wholesale commission (2.3%), retail
commission (12.0%), and value-added tax (12.5%) for local products.221 The
breakdown for imported products is made into trade price (88.89%) and retail
commission (11.11%).222
Non-essential drugs are priced through a system of indicative prices. The
rule is applicable only in the case of locally-produced goods. A fixed percentage
of mark-up is applied to the cost and freight price of finished goods to determine
the MRP of imported finished goods. This is followed irrespective of whether
they are essential or non-essential products. Therefore, for pharmaceuticals that
do not fall into the controlled category, the manufacturer is able to set the price
of the pharmaceutical. In principle, this does not mean that an exorbitant price
can be set by a manufacturer, as the price must be approved (but not controlled)
by the Drug Control Committee.223 But in practice, the Committee accepts the
pricing as offered by the manufacturers or importers if it is not within the list of
essential medicines; no other stakeholders have a say in fixing the price.224
Therefore, sometimes manufacturers or importers can fix higher prices if it is
not within the essential medicines list in Bangladesh, and the Committee will
not object or criticize the pricing.
The list needs to be updated from time to time, as in some cases the old
listed medicines may not work and patients will need expensive new medicines
that are often beyond price control. One such situation is found in multi-drug
resistance, where the older drugs are not working and yet the patient is unable to
buy the new expensive drugs. Dr. Zaman Khan explained the situation in
Bangladesh:
We have recently lost four patients to multi-drug resistance disease.
Eventually there will be new drugs but they will be even more expensive
than the antibiotics we use now, Cefrazidine from Glaxo, for instance, at
450 taka ($8) a dose or Ceftriazone from Roche, at 500 taka ($9).
Very few people can even afford the drugs we have got. . . . We ask
patients about their economic history and then we decide who can and
can’t afford drugs. But I would say 70% of the people we see cannot

220

Interview with an official at the DDA, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Feb. 26, 2012).
THE WORLD BANK, BANGLADESH: DIAGNOSTIC TRADE INTEGRATION STUDY 162
(2013), available at http://www.mincom.gov.bd/doc/dtisvoleom03.pdf.
222
Id.
223
Drugs (Control) Ordinance, 1982, § 4(2) (Bangl.).
224
Interview with a policy analyst of an international public health NGO, in Dhaka,
Bangl. (Feb. 23, 2012).
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afford to buy medicines. Even the cheaper versions are often beyond
them.225

This view is supported by Dr. Khurshid Talukder of the Institute of Child and
Mother Health in Bangladesh:
“We just want the best possible answers to treat all diseases. Simply, we
must have the drugs here when they are available in developed countries.
And they have to be affordable for poorer people to buy.” People are often
too poor to buy the correct drugs needed to cure an illness or cannot
complete the full course of medicines, which in turn leads to more
resistance.226

Public health activists and generic producers in Bangladesh raising concerns
about the possible negative impact of TRIPS on the public health situation in
Bangladesh say that “people of Bangladesh could be very seriously affected. It
is an alarming and dismal picture.”227
That is why most of the public-health NGOs and public-health experts in
Bangladesh believe that the government of Bangladesh should establish a
permanent price-control mechanism accessible to the general public and publichealth groups to make the existing price-control mechanism more effective. 228
Any individual or public-health group should then be permitted to challenge or
review the pricing of medicines on social or health grounds.229 Another concern
is that there are a number of pharmacies in the country that operate without a
license and sell pharmaceuticals to customers without a prescription and at a
higher price.230
The Committee should be given jurisdiction to deal with these issues, and
the public-health interest groups should be able to access the Committee.231 An
example of such a body is the Canadian Patented Medicine Prices Review Board
(PMPRB), established in 1987 under the Patent Act as an independent quasijudicial tribunal, which limits the prices set by manufacturers for all patented
medicines, new and existing, sold in Canada, under prescription or over the
counter, to ensure pricing is not excessive.232 As an independent quasi-judicial
body, the PMPRB carries out its mandate independently of other organizations,
such as Health Canada, which approves drugs for safety and efficacy, and public
225

OXFAM GB, supra note 201, at 4.
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Id.
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Interview with public health NGOs and pharmaceutical researchers, in Dhaka,
Bangl. (Mar. 12, 2012).
229
Id.
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Interview with a public health activist, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Dec. 23, 2009).
231
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See About PMPRB, PATENTED MEDICINE PRICES REVIEW BOARD,
http://www.pmprb-cepmb.gc.ca/english/View.asp?x=1433 (last visited Mar. 20, 2014).
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drug plans, which approve the listing of drugs on their respective formularies for
reimbursement purposes.233
The PMPRB has a dual role of regulating and reporting.234 Its regulatory
role is to protect consumers and contribute to Canadian health care by ensuring
that prices charged by manufacturers for patented medicines are not excessive. 235
Its reporting role contributes to informed decisions and policy-making by
reporting on pharmaceutical trends and on the R&D spending by pharmaceutical
patentees.236 This Board is unique in the sense that it was set up exclusively to
monitor the prices of patented drugs. Besides, the Board also analyzes the
therapeutic contribution of patented pharmaceuticals, and it documents
pharmaceutical R&D investment in Canada. A similar mechanism should be
considered by Bangladesh as it moves towards a TRIPS-compliant patent
regime.
However, it is interesting to note here that, aside from some small
pharmaceutical companies, both the leading local pharmaceutical industries in
Bangladesh and the MNPCs operating in Bangladesh oppose the price-control
mechanism.237 One participant during the interview argued that “some
companies are trying to seize the market with the low price low quality products
which may become a real threat for public health.”238 This was also supported by
another participant claiming that price control may encourage cheap drugs and
may, in a way, encourage low quality counterfeited pharmaceuticals.239 The
CEO of one small pharmaceutical company argued that that the “withdrawal of
price control will become a threat for access to medicines and for their (small
pharmaceutical companies) survival” as well.240 He further added that “it is
better to have price control to encourage local competition and ensure

233
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Id.
235
Id.
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Id.
237
The survey indicated that 50% of pharmaceutical companies operating in
Bangladesh strongly agreed with the withdrawal of price control and 27% of
pharmaceutical companies also agreed with the withdrawal (this represents all
multinational, large, and medium-sized companies that participated in the survey).
Conversely, 18% strongly disagreed and 5% disagreed with the proposition (all of them
small pharmaceutical companies).
238
Interview with an official of a large local pharmaceutical company, in Dhaka,
Bangl. (Mar. 13, 2012).
239
This view of large pharmaceutical companies was also supported by an official of a
medium-sized local pharmaceutical company during the interview, in Dhaka, Bangl.
(Mar. 13, 2012).
240
Interview with the CEO of a local pharmaceutical company, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Dec.
28, 2009).
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affordability of pharmaceuticals for the local people.”241 The Bangladesh
Association of Pharmaceutical Industries made no comment about this, as it
considered this an issue of contention both from legal and political perspectives
and agreed that in their organization there is a conflict of opinions among the
members.242 Yet, public-health NGOs and IP academics in Bangladesh support a
broadening of the role of price control and believe any attempt to withdraw price
control will be a disaster.243 One official at the DPDT in Bangladesh argued that
“reality shows that even the Government is not able to control price effectively
with the present ordinance. So the non-existence of price control would
definitely lead towards the real disaster in terms of access to drugs.”244 He
further added that “in the absence of it, the price of drugs would be sky-high,
which would ultimately lead towards the real obstacle in order to access to
drugs.”245
In India, there is a National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA)
which was established under the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995246 and
entrusted to fix or revise the prices of controlled bulk drugs and formulations
(bulk drugs are price-controlled like the essential medicines list in Bangladesh)
and to enforce prices and availability of medicines in India. It has also been
empowered with the task of recovering amounts overcharged by manufacturers
for controlled drugs from the consumers, and it also monitors the prices of
decontrolled drugs in order to keep them at reasonable levels. But, drug-control
mechanisms in India are also considered ineffective, as explained by the
taskforce popularly known as Dr. Pronab Sen Task Force, which was formed by
the government of India to evaluate the drug-control mechanisms in India.247
The taskforce argued that “no price regulatory mechanism can be effective
unless there is a credible threat of price controls being imposed and enforced.
However, it is also felt that often the present price control system is
inappropriate, inadequate, cumbersome, and time consuming.”248
241
Id. (confirming the notion of small pharmaceutical companies supporting price
control measure because the benefits consider their low production range that is limited
to certain products only).
242
Interview with an official of BAPI, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Jan. 23, 2009).
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Interview with IP academics and public health activists, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Mar. 14,
2012).
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Interview with a deputy registrar at the Department of Patents, Designs and
Trademarks, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Jan. 22, 2009).
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Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995, Gazette of India, section III(2) (Jan. 6, 1995),
available at http://nppaindia.nic.in/drug_price95/txt1.html.
247
See generally RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE CONSTITUTED UNDER THE
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http://www.drugscontrol.org/f_recom2005.pdf.
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The taskforce further recommended that “[p]rice controls should be
imposed not on the basis of turnover, but on the ‘essentiality’ of the drug and on
strategic considerations regarding the impact of price control on the therapeutic
class. This must be a dynamic process.”249 “The ceiling prices of controlled
drugs should normally not be based on cost of production, but on readily
monitorable market-based benchmarks.”250 Some other recommendations of the
taskforce which may also be relevant for Bangladesh are as follows:









A process of active promotion of generic drugs should be put in
place, including mandatory debranding for selected drugs.
All public health facilities should be required to prescribe and
dispense only generic drugs, except in cases where no generic
alternative exists.
In the case of proprietary drugs, particularly anti-HIV/AIDS and
Cancer drugs, the government should actively pursue access
programmes in collaboration with drug companies with differential
pricing and alternative packaging, if necessary.
Public Sector Enterprises (PSEs) involved in the manufacture of
drugs should be revived where possible and used as key strategic
interventions for addressing both price and availability issues.
Arrangements may need to be made to ensure their continuing
viability.
Fiscal incentives should be provided on a long-term assured basis to
research and development activities in drugs.251

One public health activist remarked that the government of Bangladesh
should also appoint a taskforce to review its drug control mechanism and that it
would benefit immensely from the Indian taskforce report suggestion to
restructure the existing drug-control mechanism.252 However, another participant
remarked that the Canadian approach is free from the problems identified by the
Indian taskforce, and, therefore, an agency like in Canada—empowered with the
recommendations made by the Dr. Pronob Sen Task Force particularly regarding
promotion of generic drugs and revival of public sector enterprise such as
essential drugs limited (governmental pharmaceutical manufacturing facility in
Bangladesh)—may help Bangladesh to develop a unique mechanism to maintain
access to medicines, to assess the R&D investment in the pharmaceutical sector,
and to feed information back to the government on such matters as incentives
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AVAILABLE LIFE-SAVING DRUGS AT REASONABLE PRICES 53–54 (Sept. 20, 2005),
available at http://pharmaceuticals.gov.in/drpronabreport.pdf (India).
252
Interview with a public health activist and policy analyst working with a public
health-based international NGO, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Feb. 11, 2012).
250
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like tax exemption and other policy measures.253 Some researchers such as A. K.
Monawar Uddin Ahmad stated that “the withdrawal of price controls of many
pharmaceutical products did not lead to any rise in the price level . . . [and] the
MRP of some finished formulations [actually] reduced due to competitive bulk
drug pricing.”254
However, price control also has some built-in limitations or problems,
such as it could disrupt the balance between supply and demand in the market. If
prices are held below natural levels, resources such as talent and investor capital
leave an industry to seek a better return elsewhere.255 Therefore, there will be
less discovery and innovation and fewer new drugs will become available to
consumers.256 Although supply and demand shift constantly based on the price
of raw materials, production costs, and local needs, the government price will
change only after a lengthy political and bureaucratic process. That is why the
government price will effectively never be an equilibrium price, which means
that the government price will be either too high or too low. 257 Price control also
could affect openness of competition and the availability of alternatives; hence,
it would tend to discourage rapid entry of generic medicines.258
In the context of Bangladesh, one important element that needs serious
consideration is that the majority of drug costs are privately paid for in the
absence of an effective health insurance system that provides access and
availability to all.259 Price regulation in most of the countries oriented towards
the determination of prices involve a government purchasing the medicines for
delivery through the public health system or fixing the reimbursement rates
against insurance claims, but rarely fixing prices prevailing in the open

253

Interview with an IP lawyer working as an in-house legal counsel and regulatory
affairs adviser at a local pharmaceutical company, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Feb. 13, 2012).
254
A.K. Monaw-war Uddin Ahmad, Competition, Regulation and the Role of the
State: The Case of Bangladesh, 53 J. ASIATIC SOC’Y OF BANGL. 199, 211 (2008).
255
Fiona M. Scott Morton, The Problems of Price Controls, REGULATION 50 (2001),
available
at
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/
2001/4/morton.pdf.
256
Id.
257
Id. at 53.
258
See Patricia Danzon & Michael Furakawa, Prices and Availability of
Pharmaceuticals, 27 HEALTH AFF. 221, 225 (2005).
259
See generally Wendy J Werner, Micro-insurance in Bangladesh: Risk Protection
for the Poor?, 27 J. HEALTH POPULATION & NUTRITION 563 (2009), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2928102/pdf/jhpn0027-0563.pdf.
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market.260 Leading large and medium pharmaceutical companies are now more
interested in exporting to other countries rather than supplying the local market
due to low profits from price-controlled products.261 Again, MNPCs operating in
Bangladesh are not interested in supplying products in the local market that are
under price control and have low profit margins.262 In the absence of production
by the MNPCs and of inadequate supply from leading local companies, small
pharmaceutical companies with inadequate quality control are trying to seize the
gap. Unless the price control mechanism works efficiently and timely with
proper information about the market and relevant products, excessive price
control in the long run will not give optimal results for public health in
Bangladesh; rather, it could create a market for low-quality cheaper products.
Considering the limitations of price control, competition law may be an
additional instrument for Bangladesh.
B. National Competition Law
While implementing the TRIPS Agreement, members can prevent the
abuse of IPRs and control anti-competitive practices either by integrating
competition rules into the national IP law or by framing a separate competition
law to prevent abusive monopoly practices or the abuse of a dominant
position.263 Article 8.2 of the TRIPS Agreement permits WTO members to adopt
“[a]ppropriate measures . . . to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights”
. . . or . . . practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the
international transfer of technology,” whereas Article 40 of the TRIPS
Agreement recognizes the possible link between intellectual property laws and
competition policy.264 Therefore, the use of competition law and policy could

260

For example, in the United Kingdom, “public health and insurance takes care of
83.4 percent of the spending on medicine, and in Germany, it is 78.5 percent.” S.
Narayan, Some Approaches to Pricing Controls for Patented Drugs in India, 41 ISAS
INSIGHTS
1,
2
(Dec.
1,
2008),
available
at
http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/94707/ipublicationdocument_singledocu
ment/f8515305-e6a3-4b13-9ba4-27d9ba38b937/en/42.pdf.
261
Interview with patent lawyers and pharmaceutical researchers, in Dhaka, Bangl.
(Mar. 14, 2012).
262
Interview with public health activists, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Mar. 16, 2012). All
activists supported the notion that MNPC’s operating in Bangladesh are not interested in
supplying products in the local market that are under price control and have low profit
margins.
263
SISLU F. MUSUNGU ET AL., UTILIZING TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH
PROTECTION THROUGH SOUTH–SOUTH REGIONAL FRAMEWORK 19–20 (2004), available at
http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/trips-health-southcentre2004.pdf.
264
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 8.2; see id. art. 30; Thomas Cottier & Ingo
Meitinger, The TRIPS Agreement Without a Competition Agreement? 4 (Fondazione Eni
Enrico Mattei Working Paper No. 65-99, 1998).
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provide developing countries with several advantages including:265 (a) countries
will have flexibilities under the TRIPS Agreement to use a competition
framework appropriate to their socioeconomic condition; (b) countries will have
the freedom to define what constitutes anti-competitive behavior; (c)
competition law and policy is well suited for implementation by an independent
competition authority vested with extensive investigative powers; and (d)
competition law and policy has already been used successfully by South Africa
to reduce the price of essential medicines.
A World Bank study emphasizing the importance of developing and
institutionalizing appropriate competition policy by the developing countries and
LDCs stated:
Unless developing countries rapidly establish adequate competition
frameworks and regulatory institutions that also address monopoly abuse
of [intellectual property rights], it is possible that increasing [intellectual
property right] protection could result in welfare losses from monopoly
behavior.266

Therefore, the government of Bangladesh should consider using the national
competition law in a way to prevent the abuse of monopoly pricing during the
post-TRIPS patent regime. Brazil introduced new competition law in December
2010,267 whereas India enacted a competition law in 2002.268 However, India and
Brazil have yet to effectively use competition law or policy for the
pharmaceutical sector, whereas South Africa has already successfully
265

Tenu Avafia et al., The Ability of Select Sub-Saharan Africa Countries to Utilize
TRIPS Flexibilities and Competition Law to Ensure a Sustainable Supply of Essential
Medicines: A Study of Producing and Importing Countries 2–4 (tralac Working Paper,
No. 12/2006, Aug. 2006), available at http://www.section27.org.za/wpcontent/uploads/2010/10/Avafia-Berger-and-Hartzenberg.pdf.
266
THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT : BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR
MARKETS 147 (2002), available at http://www.ctc-health.org.cn/file/2009083127.pdf.
267
In Brazil, a competition law, Law No. 8,884/94, was replaced by an updated
Competition Act, Law No. 12,529/11, which went into force on May 29, 2012. Ana Paula
Martinez, Abuse of Dominance: The Third Wave of Brazil’s Antitrust Enforcement?, 9
COMPETITION L. INT’L 169, 170 (2013). Article 1 of the Brazilian competition law states
that the statute’s objective is to set “out antitrust measures in keeping with such
constitutional principles as free enterprise and open competition, the social role of
property, consumer protection, and restraint of abuses of economic power.” Federal Law
No. 8,884 of June 11, 1994 (Braz.).
268
In India, the Competition Act was enacted in 2002 to replace the Monopolies and
Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act, 1969. Terry Calvani & Karen Alderman, Bric in
the International Merger Review Edifice, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 73, 74 n.3 (2010). It
established the Competition Commission of India to “eliminate practices having adverse
effect on competition, to promote and sustain competition, protect the interests of
consumers and ensure freedom of trade carried on by other participants” in markets.
Vinod Dhall, Competition Law in India, 21-SPG ANTITRUST 73, 73 (2007).
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implemented and tested its competition law in the pharmaceutical sector, and,
therefore, South African competition law appears to have a viable role to play in
reducing the price of medicines.269 Therefore, the model of South African
competition law should be adapted to suit Bangladesh’s unique national
circumstances.
In South Africa, the Medicines and Related Substances Control
Amendment Act270 created ground for using competition law to ensure access to
medicines in case of excessive pricing and abuse of a dominant position. This
Act was enacted in response to the HIV/AIDS crisis that the country had been
facing and in response to the lack of access to pharmaceuticals due to cost.
Section 15C, considered controversial by the MNPCs, reads:
Section 15C - Measures to ensure supply of more affordable medicines
The Minister may prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable
medicines in certain circumstances so as to protect the health of the public,
and in particular may (a) notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Patents Act,
1978 (Act 57 of 1978) determine that the rights with regard to any
medicine under a patent granted in the Republic shall not extend to
acts in respect of such medicine which has been put onto the market
by the owner of the medicine, or with his or her consent;
(b) prescribe the conditions on which any medicine which is identical in
composition, meets the same quality standard and is intended to have
the same proprietary name as that of another medicine already
registered in the Republic, but which is imported by a person other
than the person who is the holder of the registration certificate of the
medicine already registered and which originates from any site of
manufacture of the original manufacturer as approved by the council
in the prescribed manner, may be imported.271

The above provision authorizes the South African government to
determine to what extent a specific drug patent will apply. This provision was a

269
See generally Carina Smit, The Rationale for Competition Policy: A South African
Perspective (2005), available at http://ri.search.yahoo.com/_ylt=A0LEViuCLa9Td0A
AP8UPxQt.;_ylu=X3oDMTByMG04Z2o2BHNlYwNzcgRwb3MDMQRjb2xvA2JmMQ
R2dGlkAw--/RV=2/RE=1404018178/RO=10/RU=http%3a%2f%2fwww.econex.co.za%
2findex.php%3foption%3dcom_docman%26task%3ddoc_download%26gid%3d9%26Ite
mid%3d60/RK=0/RS=NdgxNzag2LVbPCuMZOSFbG1.BJU-.
270
Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of 1997 (S. Afr.),
available at http://www.afma.co.za/imgs/New%20AFMA%20links/AFMA%20Website/
ACT%20101%20of%201965%20-%20MEDICINES%20AND%20RELATED%20SUBS
TANCES%20CONTROL%20ACT/ACT%20101%20of%201965%20%20Amendment.pdf.
271
Id. at § 15C.

460

Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

[Vol. 13

direct challenge to the pharmaceutical industry.272 Such an enactment
demonstrates that in becoming TRIPS compliant, a nation may avail itself of
some latitude within the flexibilities allowed under the TRIPS Agreement;
particularly, in pursuance of the imperative of public welfare.
The South African Competition Commission has already applied
competition law successfully in the pharmaceutical sector to deal with restrictive
practices and abuse of a dominant position. In Hazel Tau and Others vs.
GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim, the prices set by these two
companies were considered an obstacle to access to antiretroviral medicines.273
The Competition Commission ruled that they had violated the Competition Act,
1998 by “1. Den[ying]a competitor access to an essential facility[,] 2. Excessive
pricing[,] and 3. Engag[ing] in an exclusionary act,” whereas the pharmaceutical
companies were merely exercising the exclusive right they were granted through
their patent as in many other countries.274 Yet, the Commissioner stated:
Our investigation revealed that each of the firms has refused to license
their patents to generic manufacturers in return for a reasonable royalty.
We believe that this is feasible and that consumers will benefit from
cheaper generic versions of the drugs concerned. We further believe that
granting licenses would provide for competition between firms and their
generic competitors. We will request the Tribunal to make an order
authorising any person to exploit the patents to market generic versions of

272

According to Court Case Between 39 Pharmaceutical Firms and The South African
Government, CPTECH, http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/pharma-v-sa.html (last visited
Apr. 5, 2014):
A group of 39 pharmaceutical companies has dropped its lawsuits against the
government of South Africa. They had taken South Africa to court over its
Medicines and Related Substances Act. The main issue was Amendment 15(c)
which would allow TRIPS-compliant compulsory licensing and parallel imports of medicines in South Africa. The suit was first filed on February 18,
1998.
On March 6, 2001, the South African court hearing the case ruled that the
Treatment Access Campaign (TAC) would be granted a friend of the court role.
It also adjourned the case until April 18, bowing to threats from the PMA to file
an appeal on the grounds that they needed additional time to response [sic] to
the new evidence and issues raised by TAC.
On April 19, 2001, the pharmaceuticals companies, under an extremely high
amount of international pressure, dropped their case.
273
See Competition Commission Finds Pharmaceutical Firms in Contravention of the
Competition
Act,
CPTECH
(Oct.
16,
2003),
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/cc10162003.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2014).
274
Id.
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the respondents’ patented medicines or fixed dose combinations that
require these patents, in return for the payment of a reasonable royalty.275

Even though the two companies denounced the complaint as unfounded,
they compromised with the Commission and granted voluntary licenses to
produce a generic version of their patented pharmaceuticals. Since this case,
there has been huge success in South Africa toward providing access to
pharmaceuticals for anti-HIV and AIDS.276
The government of Bangladesh enacted Competition Act, 2012 in June,
2012.277 According to one study, “A draft bill for such a law was first proposed
in 1996; however, it took sixteen years to finally come to fruition.”278 The
progress of the bill was delayed: “the political will to implement a competition
law is limited, and there [was] some opposition from business groups.”279
Indeed, competition problems are potentially more serious in a country such as
Bangladesh, which has “a weaker private sector, where one or a few dominant
firms can take control” and abuse their dominant position.280 The media
coverage suggests that “Bangladesh may suffer from significant competition
problems, with substantial costs to consumers” and to the public-health sector of
Bangladesh, more particularly. 281
The government of Bangladesh should use the competition law given that
its objective should be the welfare of its population. Despite the enactment of
the competition law back in 2012, it has yet to be implemented as the Ministry
of Commerce in Bangladesh has not adopted rules required to enforce it.282
However, when considering some weaknesses within South African competition
law, it is suggested that in any future Bangladeshi competition law, “to increase
its effectiveness as a tool for reducing prices of essential medicines,” any
275
Rachel Roumet, Access to Patented Anti-HIV/AIDS Medicine: The South African
Experience, 3 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.137, 141 (2010) (quoting South African
Competition Finds GSK and BI Responsible for ‘Excessive Pricing’ and ‘Abuse of
Market Position, HIV Treatment Bulletin, at 10, Dec. 2003/Jan. 2004, available at ibase.info/htb/files/2010/03/htb4-10dec03.pdf.
276
Id.
277
RAFIA AFRIN WITH DANIEL SABET, WILL BANGLADESH’S NEW COMPETITION LAW
PROVE
EFFECTIVE?
1
(July
2012),
available
at
http://www.ulab.edu.bd/CES/documents/Competition_law_07-12.pdf.
278
Id.
279
KAREN ELLIS ET AL., ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF COMPETITION : FINDINGS
FROM BANGLADESH v (2010), available at http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/
files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/6058.pdf.
280
Id. at 2.
281
Id.
282
Shakhawat Hossain, No enforcement of Laws on Food Adulteration, Children, Fair
Trade, NEW AGE (May 19, 2014 1:14 AM), http://newagebd.net/12634/no-enforcementof-laws-on-food-adulteration-children-fair-trade/#sthash.IMYI3DvK.dpuf (last visited
June 30, 2014).
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competition commission should be empowered with the authority to issue
compulsory licenses, to recommend fixed royalty rates and also to expressly
allow for the export of products produced under compulsory licenses in order to
maintain sustainable investment.283 In addition, LDCs such as Bangladesh may
also stipulate in national competition law that compulsory licensing could be
granted in cases of anticompetitive behavior such as in the case of the patent
holder’s unilateral refusal to grant a license (refusal to deal).284 Competition law
could also be applied in the case of obtaining pharmaceutical patents in an
unjustified and fraudulent manner.285 Again, the issues of “poor quality” and
“frivolous” patents and regulatory practices such as marketing approval and data
exclusivity can also be controlled under competition law.286
During an interview, the participant argued that use of competition law
would be a viable tool for Bangladesh to prevent excessive pricing and to allow
generic production of particular pharmaceutical products if there is any abuse of
dominant position as it would be extremely difficult for Bangladesh to allow a
compulsory license under the patent law due to political pressure from the
developed countries.287 In contrast, another participant argued that even use of
competition law may not be so easy as it may also face political pressure and the
competition authority should also have enough expertise and resources to guide
its reasoning.288
Another alternative government-intervention mechanism is a prize
system.
C. Introduction of Patent Prize System
The use of patent prizes as an alternative to patents as proposed by some
scholars such as Joseph E. Stiglitz could address the lack of incentive for
problems such as disease in developing countries and would provide
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Avafia et al., supra note 265, at 6.
See Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property and Competition Law: Exploring of
Some Issues of Relevance to Developing Countries 8–12, 20–22 (Int’l Centre for Trade
and Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper No. 21, Oct. 2007), available at
http://ictsd.org/i/publications/11376/?view=document.
285
See id. at 13–19. In fact, these patents should never have been granted in the first
place. Lack of proper resources, expertise, and proper examination in the LDCs may
allow for such fraudulent registrations. In these situations, competition law plays an
important role.
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See id. at 13–16.
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Interview with an IP academic at University of Chittagong, in Chittagong, Bangl.
(Jan. 18, 2012).
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Interview with a public health activist, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Jan. 23, 2012).
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immediately affordable pricing for products still under patent protection.289 In a
prize system, “[i]nstead of authorizing drug developers to exclude competitors,
the government would pay successful developers,” and, therefore, “[o]ther
firms, including generic drug manufacturers, would be free to make and sell the
drugs in question.”290 It is also stated that, in some studies, many drug
companies spend much of the money earned through patents on marketing and
advertising as opposed to researching for the new drugs.291
However, “[t]he controversy between a patent and prize systems [sic]
reaches as far back as the nineteenth century” where “commentators proposed
‘bonuses’[be] granted to inventors by the government, professional associations
financed by private industries, intergovernmental agencies, or an international
association funded by private industries” internationally.292 Michael Polanvyi
trumpeted the idea of prizes as a means of patent reform back in 1944 stating
that “[i]n order that inventions may be used freely by all, we must relieve
inventors of the necessity of earning their rewards commercially and must grant
them instead the right to be rewarded from the public purse.”293 However, these
suggestions did not garner much support.
The Royal Academy of Science in Paris had a prize system that “served
as a model for scientific societies in other countries during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. The lack of a central authority or specific policy for prize
distribution” made the prize system contentious and, some claimed, corrupt.294
“Academy members were at odds when trying to determine which fields should
receive general prizes,” and “[s]uch disputes were only partly resolved by
commissions represented by multiple disciplines. At the same time, prizes were
289
See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Scrooge and Intellectual Property Rights, 333 BRITISH MED.
J. 1279 –80 (2006); see also Joseph E. Stiglitz & Arjun Jayadev, Medicine for
Tomorrow: Some Alternative Proposals to Promote Socially Beneficial Research and
Development in Pharmaceuticals, 7 J. GENERIC MEDS., 217–26 (2010).
290
William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, A Prize System as a Partial Solution to the
Health Crisis in the Developing World, in INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH:
PATENT LAW AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 182 (Thomas Pogge et al. eds.,
2010).
291
See generally Mayer Brezis, Big Pharma and Health Care: Unsolvable Conflict of
Interests Between Private Enterprise and Public Health, 45 ISRAEL J. PSYCHIATRY &
RELATED
SCI.
83
(2008),
available
at
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact
=8&ved=0CDEQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fpublichealth.doctorsonly.co.il%2Fwpcontent%2Fuploads%2F2011%2F12%2F2008_2_3.pdf&ei=tcpaU6HqKOibygGWgIGA
DQ&usg=AFQjCNEMADdtvGdLYfBgHEf6vNfUNfAzJg&sig2=WHkdek0mZKGiZN2
vtwhjmw.
292
Marlynn Wei, Should Prizes Replace Patents? A Critique of the Medical
Innovation Prize Act of 2005, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 25, 28–29 (2007).
293
Michael Polanvyi, Patent Reform, 11 REV. ECON. STUD. 61, 65 (1944) (emphasis
omitted).
294
Wei, supra note 292, at 29 (footnote omitted).
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becoming increasingly a matter solely of money, not honor.”295 The “ultimate
question of whether the costs outweigh the benefits of a prize system over a
patent system remains open” and is one that “can only be answered
empirically.”296 There are few studies that have focused on the economic effects
of prizes,297 and there is no consensus on how prize systems should be
designed.298
Nevertheless, a prize system may be designed to encourage local
pharmaceutical companies and MNPCs to invest in R&D for the diseases most
prevalent in Bangladesh. A prize system is justified on the grounds that granting
patents stimulates a monopoly rather than the R&D necessary to deal with
particular problems of a country without resources such as Bangladesh, or of
inventing something where there is no hope of a huge profit.299 Further, it is
criticized that “the patent system and other exclusive rights contribute to high
drug prices, global health inequities, limited access to potentially life-saving
medicines and medical technologies, and the production of drugs that have little
incremental therapeutic value.”300 In a system that rewards patent owners,
pharmaceutical companies will target only affluent patients who can pay more
or significantly higher prices that cover the cost of research, development, and
marketing; therefore, “pharmaceutical companies have little incentive to invest
in R&D for low-return . . . neglected diseases, or other ‘non-profitable’
diseases.”301 The World Health Organization “estimates approximately ten
million lives could have been saved with access to existing medicines and
295
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Id. at 31.
297
See generally Lee N. Davis, Should We Consider Alternative Incentives for Basic
Research? Patents vs. Prizes (2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at
www.druid.dk/conferences/summer2002/Papers/DAVIS.pdf.
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Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV.115, 121 (2003).
299
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Wei, supra note 292, at 26 (footnote omitted). Many authors have criticized the
growing numbers of “me-too” drugs on the market, products that duplicate the
therapeutic value of already existing drugs. See Aidan Hollis, An Efficient Reward
System for Pharmaceutical Innovation 6 (June 10, 2004) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&
ved=0CCgQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.who.int%2Fintellectualproperty%2Fnew
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Moon & Kerry Herman, Marketing Antidepressants: Prozac and Paxil (Harvard Business
School Case 502-055, Oct. 2005). For an argument favorable toward “me-too” drugs for
creating competition, see Thomas H. Lee, “Me-too” Products: Friend or Foe?, 350 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 211 (Jan. 15, 2004).
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Wei, supra note 292, at 26. Only 10% of the world’s expenditure on R&D is spent
on targeting 90% of the disease burden. Id. at 26 n.5 (citing Amy Kapczynski et al.,
Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University
Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1042–57 (2005).
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vaccines. The deadweight loss of monopoly pricing of drugs is anywhere
between $3 billion to $30 billion annually for the U.S. drug market alone.302 In
this context, a prize system has three underlying goals: (i) to provide incentives
for R&D in new, significantly better medicines; (ii) to enhance access to
medicines; and (iii) to focus more resources on non-profitable diseases such as
neglected diseases.303
Considering potential benefits and limitations, Bangladesh could
introduce a prize system while maintaining the patent system initially rather than
preventing patents altogether. The prize system should have as its principle
queries: (1) the number of patients benefited by the invention/innovation; (2)
“the incremental therapeutic benefits of the innovation; (3) the degree to which
the innovation addresses healthcare needs, including global infectious diseases,
orphan illnesses, and neglected diseases affecting the poor in developing
countries; and (4) ‘[t]he improved efficiency of manufacturing processes for
drugs.’”304
During World Health Assembly 60.30:
The governments of Bolivia, Suriname and Bangladesh present[ed] for
discussion a proposal concerning the possible use of prizes as a new
incentive mechanism for innovation in new cancer treatments and vaccines
that would separate rewards to innovation from the price of the products.
...
This proposal is based on an earlier proposal presented by the governments
of Barbados & Bolivia in April 2008 during the WHO Intergovernmental
Working Group on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property.305

As mentioned in the proposal, “[a]ccess to new cancer treatments and vaccines
in developing countries is limited, due to several factors including, but not
limited to: poor medical infrastructure; inadequate screening; and the high costs
302

Wei, supra note 292, at 26–27 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 28 (footnotes omitted).
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Id. at 34; see also Fisher & Syed, supra note 290.
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PROPOSAL BY BOLIVIA, SURINAME AND BANGLADESH: PRIZES AS A REWARD
MECHANISM FOR NEW CANCER TREATMENTS AND VACCINES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1
(Apr.
15,
2009)
[hereinafter
PROPOSAL],
available
at
http://www.who.int/phi/Bangladesh_Bolivia_Suriname_CancerPrize.pdf. The proposal
stated:
According to the WHO, of the more than 8 million persons who died from cancer in 2008, 5.7 million, or 71 percent, lived in developing countries. Cancer is
a leading cause of death worldwide. According to the WHO, the percentage of
total deaths attributed to cancer is expected to decline in developed countries,
but to increase in all developing country regions.
Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Krista L. Cox, The Medicines Patent Pool: Promoting
Access and Innovation for Life-Saving Medicines Through Voluntary Licenses, 4
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 291 (2012).
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of oncology equipment, services and medicines.”306 It also mentioned that
“[h]igh prices for new cancer drugs and vaccines either discourage use
completely, or place enormous burdens on the healthcare budgets of developing
countries. Treatments for several new cancer drugs exceed [U.S.] $50,000 per
completed course.”307
However, this was not a proposal for a global prize fund; rather, it
suggested that “national governments in developing countries introduce a new
system of rewarding the development of new medicines and vaccines for
cancer.”308 Specifically, it proposes “that developing countries de-monopolize
the entire sector of medicines and vaccines for cancer, and permit free entry by
generic suppliers.”309 The proposal further states that “[i]n return for ending the
monopoly, developing country governments would offer to provide a domestic
system of rewards for developers of new medicines and vaccines for cancer that
is based on a fixed percentage of the national budget for cancer treatments.”310
It was argued that such a proposal is consistent with the TRIPS
Agreement as developing countries “can eliminate the exclusive rights to use
patented inventions, in cases where patent owners receive remuneration or
compensation.”311 However, there has been no outcome from this proposal.
Again, “[o]n February 24, 2005, some 162 leading medical researchers, NGOs,
parliamentarians, government officials, and other stakeholders submitted a letter
to the [WHO] asking that it evaluate a proposal for a new global treaty to
support medical R&D.”312 The letter proposed “to deal with higher drug prices
for consumers in developed and developing countries by introducing a Medical
R&D Treaty Framework that could ultimately replace existing or planned trade
agreements that focus on patents or drug prices.”313
According to a paper by Andrew Farlow:
In late 2005 Kenya formally submitted a resolution to the WHO’s
Executive Board (WHO EB) asking for the creation of a working group of
member states to consider the [Medical R&D treaty (MRDT)]. In January
2006 Brazil co-sponsored the resolution. Subsequently, the WHO EB

306

PROPOSAL, supra note 305, at 2.
Id.
308
Id.
309
Id.
310
Id. (emphasis omitted).
311
Id. at 3; see also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 30, 31, 44.
312
Proposal for Treaty on Medical Research and Development (Feb. 2005), CPTECH,
http://www.cptech.org/workingdrafts/rndtreaty.html (last visited April 5, 2014).
313
Id.
307
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approved a heavily bracketed version of a draft resolution. That draft was
debated at the World Health Assembly (WHA) in late May 2006.314

The MRDT would require all countries—rich and poor—to pledge to spend a
fixed percent of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on medical R&D.315 The
WHO Consultative Expert Working Group (CEWG) report also proposed the
creation of a new binding agreement to provide billions of dollars annually for
R&D to address the special health care needs of poor persons living in
developing countries, and to introduce new approaches to funding R&D that
included open innovation models, the delinkage of R&D costs from product
prices and technology transfer and capacity building in developing countries.316
However, the CEWG report also stated that “[w]e see a convention not as a
replacement for the existing intellectual property rights system, but as a
supplementary instrument where the current system does not function.”317
“Although the sponsors believe that a treaty on MRDT would
considerably ‘transform the landscape of biomedical innovation to incorporate
needs-driven health research and development,’ several developed country
members, primarily the U.S. and the EU, said that the WHO was not an
appropriate forum for discussing the treaty.”318 Finally the WHO negotiations on
MRDT ended without any concrete action, and, instead, the WHO deferred the
issues until 2016 by deciding to convene another open-ended meeting of
Member States prior to the 69th WHA in May 2016 to assess progress and
continue discussions on the remaining issues in relation to monitoring,

314

Andrew Farlow, A Global Medical Research and Development Treaty: An Answer
to Global Health Needs? 12 (2007) (IPN Working Paper on Intellectual Property,
Innovation
and
Health),
available
at
http://www.andrewfarlow.com/global_medical_research_treaty.pdf; see WHO, [GLOBAL
FRAMEWORK ON ] ESSENTIAL HEALTH RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, in EXECUTIVE
BOARD, 117TH SESSION, RESOLUTIONS, DECISIONS, AND ANNEXES 20 (Jan. 27, 2006),
available at http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB117-REC1/B117_REC1-en.pdf.
315
Ryan Abbot, Potential Elements of the WHO Global R&D Treaty: Tailoring
Solutions for Disparate Contexts, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (Jan. 29, 2013),
http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/01/29/potential-elements-of-the-who-global-rd-treatytailoring-solutions-for-disparate-contexts/.
316
Id.
317
Research and Development to Meet Health Needs in Developing Countries:
Strengthening Global Financing and Coordination, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
(Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.who.int/phi/CEWG_Report_5_April_2012.pdf.
318
WHO Tackles Intellectual Property, R&D Treaty, BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS
DIGEST
1,
3
(May
27,
2009),
available
at
http://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/review/bridgesweekly/bridgesweekly13-19.pdf.
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coordination and financing for health R&D.319 Public health groups like
Knowledge Ecology International criticized the outcome by saying that:
A treaty on R&D financing would have not have cost the United States
any money, while creating obligations on other countries to pay more for
global health R&D projects. The only reason for blocking this initiative
was to protect the existing drug development business model. The existing
model benefits big pharma the most, and exploits consumers and
marginalizes the poor.320

On the basis that there is no international scheme, Bangladesh would try a
country-specific prize fund based on the most preventable diseases in
Bangladesh. During surveys of the pharmaceutical companies in Bangladesh,
none of them showed any interest in the prize system. However, pharmaceutical
researchers and public health NGOs termed this as a viable option during
interviews.321
Limiting data protection could also be a policy position in need of
consideration by the government of Bangladesh.
D. Limit Data Protection
Pharmaceutical companies are required to submit test and clinical data
relating to safety and efficacy to national health authorities to get marketing
approval for any newly-developed pharmaceuticals.322 The data exclusivity
provisions “refer to a practice whereby, for a fixed period of time, national drug
regulatory authorities prevent and block the registration files of an originator to
be used to register a therapeutically equivalent generic version of that medicine
without obtaining the consent of the patent holder unless the generic
manufacturer actually conducts the clinical trials again.”323

319
See James Love, WHO Negotiators Propose Putting Off R&D Treaty Discussions
Until 2016, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INTERNATIONAL (Nov. 28, 2012, 8:22 PM),
http://keionline.org/node/1612.
320
Id.
321
Based on the interview responses from pharmaceutical academics and researchers.
322
Carlos M. Correa, Protecting Test Data for Pharmaceutical and Agrochemical
Products
Under
Free
Trade
Agreements,
IPRSONLINE,
http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio/docs/Correa_Bellagio4.pdf.
323
“Data exclusivity was first introduced in 1987 in a number of European countries to
compensate for insufficient product patent protection. However, product patents for
twenty years are now available in all 27 EU member states. The rules on data exclusivity
have been changed in the EU pharmaceutical laws adopted in 2004.” MOHAMMED EL
SAID, PUBLIC HEALTH RELATED TRIPS-PLUS PROVISIONS IN BILATERAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS: A POLICY GUIDE FOR NEGOTIATORS AND IMPLEMENTERS IN THE WHO
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN REGION 186 n.15 (World Health Org. & Int’l Ctr. for Trade &
Sustainable Dev., 2010), available at http://applications.emro.who.int/dsaf/dsa1081.pdf.

No. 2]

Globalizing Standard of Patent Protection in WTO Law and Policy
Options for the LDCs: The Context of Bangladesh

469

Supporters of data exclusivity provisions consider it important to
compensate for inordinate delays in granting patents and also to recover
investment and research costs for the innovators. On the other hand, generic
companies believe:
Data exclusivity has nothing to do with protecting research data. Long
after the data exclusivity period has expired, the originator documentation
remains protected by copyright laws and other legal provisions. Data
exclusivity merely extends the originator company’s market monopoly
over a product by not allowing the authorities to process an application for
marketing authorisation.324

Therefore, “[d]ata exclusivity can be a barrier to generic entry irrespective of
whether the drug was patented, or if the patent period has expired.”325
In India, when generic companies apply for approval of a pharmaceutical,
they are not required to conduct their own studies and submit independent
data.326 Rather, companies can rely on the safety and efficacy data submitted by
the innovator company to get marketing approval for their products.327
Article 39.3328 of the TRIPS Agreement is being interpreted by some
multinational companies and some developed countries, particularly in the
United States, “to mean that WTO member countries are required to grant data
exclusivity for a specified period of time.”329 Yet, in tracing the history and the

324

Data
Exclusivity,
EUROPEAN
GENETIC
MEDICINES
ASSOCIATION,
http://198.170.119.137/gen-dataex.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
325
INTEGRATING REPORT, supra note 28, at 62.
326
Animesh Sharma, Data Exclusivity with Regard to Clinical Data, 3 INDIAN J. L. &
TECH. 82, 96–97 (2007), available at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=
&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CDMQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ijlt.in%
2Farchive%2Fvolume3%2FSharma%2520-%2520Data%2520Exclusivity%2520with%
2520regard%2520to%2520Clinical%2520Data%2520%5B3%2520Indian%2520J.%2520
L.%2520%26%2520Tech.%252082%5D.pdf&ei=4ixcU-HwEIL4yQH_wYDgAg&usg=
AFQjCNHBhgliAokiwM2bWu0ZZf96wThMaA.
327
Id. at 84.
328
Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement states:
Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of which
involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair commercial
use. In addition, Members shall protect such data against disclosure, except
where necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that
the data are protected against unfair commercial use.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 39.3.
329
Sudip Chaudhuri, TRIPS and Changes in Pharmaceutical Patent Regime in India
19 (Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Working Paper No. 535, Jan. 2005).
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text of Article 39, scholars “have concluded that the protection need not be in
the form of data exclusivity.”330
If data exclusivity “were the intention then the terms ‘exclusive rights’
would have been used as in Article 70.9” of the TRIPS Agreement.331 Article
39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement “requires countries to protect data against ‘unfair
commercial use.’”332 Additionally, “countries have the discretion to [protect
data] not through data exclusivity but by proscribing situations where a
competitor obtains the results of testing data through fraud, breach of confidence
or other ‘dishonest’ practices and derive a commercial advantage.”333 Thus,
“[p]rotection is not necessary if regulatory authorities do not require the
submission of such data for marketing approval or if the data are already
public.”334 Protection should only be required for new chemical entities so that
each country can have considerable freedom “in defining what is ‘new,’ and
may exclude the different formulations based on the same chemicals.”335
Thus the TRIPS Agreement requires “data protection” but does not
require data exclusivity as there is a clear distinction between these two
concepts. Data exclusivity involves a monopoly right over test data for a certain
period of time, whereas data protection only requires authorities to keep the data
confidential. In a WHO study it is quite clearly mentioned that:
Given the negative impact on public health and access to medicines of
providing for data exclusivity, it is important that developing countries try
to avoid it. If unable to avoid data exclusivity, countries should limit the
duration of data exclusivity as well as its scope (e.g., only for new
chemical entities, and only for undisclosed data). Countries should also
consider creating exemption mechanisms by which they can exempt
products from data exclusivity provisions if necessary.336

Moreover, the CIPIH Report also reaffirms this under Recommendation 4.20,
which states:
Developing countries need to decide in the light of their own
circumstances, what provisions, consistent with the TRIPS agreement,
would benefit public health, weighing the positive effects against the
negative effects. A public health justification should be required for data
protection rules going beyond what is required by the TRIPS agreement.
There is unlikely to be such a justification in markets with a limited ability
330

Id.
Id.
332
Id.; see TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 39.3.
333
Chaudhuri, supra note 329, at 19.
334
Id.
335
Id. at 20.
336
WORLD HEALTH ORG., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO
MEDICINES: A SOUTH-EAST ASIA PERSPECTIVE ON GLOBAL ISSUES 28 (2008), available at
http://apps.searo.who.int/pds_docs/B3468.pdf.
331
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to pay and little innovative capacity. Thus, developing countries should
not impose restrictions for the use of or reliance on such data in ways that
would exclude fair competition or impede the use of flexibilities built into
TRIPS.337

During the surveys in Bangladesh, all but one of the participants argued
that Bangladesh should not give any test data protection.338 They also stated that
it would be beneficial to follow the Indian approach so as to allow generic
competition.339 One participant argued that granting test data protection over
clinical and pre-clinical trial data could restrict entry of generic medicines as
local pharmaceutical companies in Bangladesh lacks financial and technical
resources to conduct original clinical trial.340 However, one MNPC remarked in
the survey that “test data protection may encourage foreign direct investment
and technology transfer in Bangladesh.”341
As an LDC, Bangladesh is still enjoying the Doha waiver for
pharmaceutical patents; therefore, currently, there is no test-data protection
system in Bangladesh, and Bangladesh should maintain that position so as to
help local generic producers. However, Bangladesh should work towards
creating a patent pool in cooperation with other countries and private
organizations.
E. Patent Pool on Country Specific Diseases
A patent pool is an agreement between two or more patent owners to
license one or more of their patents to one another or third parties, whether they
are transferred directly by the patentee to license or through any medium, such
as a joint venture, set up specifically to administer the patent pool.342 Therefore,
a patent pool is a mechanism through which various patents held by different
entities such as companies, universities, and research institutions are made
available to others for production or further development.343 The patent holders
receive royalties for the use of the patent not from the user directly, but from the

337

CIPIH REPORT, supra note 27, at 126.
In the survey, all the local (large, medium, and small) pharmaceutical companies
supported the Indian position while one MNPC supported test data protection and other
MNPCs did not disclose their position on the issue.
339
Id.
340
Interview with an academic at the University of Dhaka, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Mar. 13,
2009) (discussing the pharmaceutical technology).
341
From survey response by one MNPC, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Jan. 22, 2009).
342
See Steven C. Carlson, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON
REG. 359, 367–68 (1999).
343
See Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Exchange: The Case of
Patent Pools, in INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTS: NOVEL CLAIMS TO PROTECTION AND THEIR
BOUNDARIES (Rochelle Dreyfuss, ed., 2001).
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pool management.344 Patent pools are increasingly seen as a useful tool in
tackling barriers to access to medicines in developing countries through the
sharing of knowledge and technologies.345
The rationale for creating a patent pool is that it helps to lower the price
of pharmaceuticals, and it enhances innovation by considering particular local
health needs.346 Further, “[a] patent pool that licenses patents in several countries
can ensure that generic manufacturers operate in efficient economies of scale”
and can ensure enhanced capacity to manage legal issues as the multitude of
patents, potential claims of infringement, variance of national laws, complexity
of international treaties and national patent laws and “complicated rules for the
export of medical technologies under compulsory licenses present barriers for
the expanded use of generic medicines.”347 Patent-pool managers “have the
expertise and capacity to manage issues that arise on behalf of governments,
donors, public health agencies, patent owners and generic manufacturers.”348 It
is also worth noting that collective management of the patent pool “will help
[establish] global ‘best practice’ norms for licensing on such issues as quality
control, remuneration, open competition, etc.”349
The World Health Assembly of the WHO discussed patent pools back in
2008 and later in the Consultative Expert Working Group Report, and
considered it a feasible mechanism to accelerate the availability of low-cost
newer medicines in developing countries.350 However, the possibility of creating
a medicines patent pool (MPP) was first proposed to UNITAID in 2006 by
Knowledge Ecology International (KEI) and Médecins Sans Frontières,
following a proposal by KEI at the International AIDS Conference in 2002.351
Then UNITAID played an instrumental role in the creation of the MPP and
decided to explore the possibility of establishing a MPP in July 2008. Finally,
UNITAID decided in December 2009 to create and fund a patent pool focusing
on increasing access to HIV medicines in developing countries, which became a
reality in July 2010. It has also been endorsed by the WHO, the U.N. High Level
344

Manisha Singh Nair, Rationality of a Patent Pool, IP FRONTLINE (Apr. 3, 2009),
http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id=22735&deptid=6.
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Id.
346
Id.
347
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INTERNATIONAL, IGWG SUBMISSION ON COLLECTIVE
MANAGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY -- THE USE OF PATENT POOLS TO EXPAND
ACCESS TO NEEDED MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 3 (Sept. 30, 2007), available at
http://www.who.int/phi/public_hearings/second/contributions_section2/Section2_Manon
Ress-PatentPool.pdf.
348
Id.
349
Id.
350
David de Ferranti, Can Patent Pools Get More AIDS Drugs to Patients?,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-de-ferranti/aidsdrugs_b_1404218.html.
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Id.
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Meeting on AIDS, and the Group of 8 as a promising approach to improve
access to HIV medicines.
The MPP negotiates with the patent holders to license to the MPP.352 This
means that the patent holder allows other producers to manufacture and sell lowcost, quality versions of the patented medicine in developing countries, or
develop adapted formulations under certain terms and conditions. The MPP
seeks licenses that push the status quo in the direction of greater access to
medicines—covering more countries and containing public-health oriented
terms and conditions—with the ultimate aim of ensuring all people living with
HIV in developing countries can access the treatment they need at affordable
prices.
Once the license is signed with the original patent holder, the MPP
proceeds to make sub-licenses with the low cost generic manufacturers and
other entities. The manufacturer is then free to develop, produce and sell the
medicine in the agreed countries under strict quality assurance. It is stated that
“[t]he MPP will particularly ease the development and production of fixed-dose
combination drugs (FDCs) that have proven to simplify treatment for people
living with HIV and facilitate treatment scale-up in developing countries, and
medicines suited for the specific needs of children.”353 In this way, more people
can be treated with the same amount of money, which is crucial in a climate of
increasing needs and funding challenges. “Patent holders can get a small royalty
on the sales of the medicines, and people living with HIV get access to
affordable, adapted treatment they need at prices they can afford.”354 Figure 1
depicts the working procedure of MPP.

352

For details about the working procedure of the MPP, see About the MPP,
MEDICINES PATENT POOL, http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/about/ (last visited Mar.
15, 2014).
353
Id.
354
Id.
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Figure 1 Working Procedure of MPP355
In analyzing the importance of the MPP, it was remarked in the
Huffington Post:
As of today, the history of the MPP is still being written. It will be
important to see over the coming year whether this patent pool will
become large enough to effectively accelerate the production of low-cost
generic versions of new AIDS drugs and the creation of the fixed-dose
combination. Millions of patients in countries around the world will be
affected by what happens.356

Bangladesh could consider a patent-pool structure for prevalent diseases
in Bangladesh jointly in consultation with other countries having necessity of
such pharmaceuticals. This could be accomplished by using Articles 66.2357 and
67358 of the TRIPS Agreement to seek technical and financial cooperation from
developed countries for developing a patent pool for the specific prevalent
diseases in Bangladesh. During the surveys, none of the pharmaceutical
companies expressed any interest in the patent pool. However, during the
interview some participants argued that this option may be useful for

355

How It Works, MEDICINES PATENT POOL, http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/wpcontent/uploads/how-it-works-diagram.png (last visited Mar. 24, 2014).
356
deFerranti, supra note 350.
357
Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that “Developed country Members
shall provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose
of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country Members
in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base.” TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 2, art. 66.2. “This article puts an obligation on developed Member
countries to provide incentives to enterprises and institutions. However, the precise
nature of the incentives is not established; only their end is spelled out: to enable LDC
members ‘to create a sound and viable technological base.’” Carlos Correa, Intellectual
Property in LDCs: Strategies for Enhancing Technology Transfer and Dissemination 3,
18 (UNCTAD The Least Developed Countries Report 2007, Background Paper No. 4,
2007), available at http://unctad.org/Sections/ldc_dir/docs/ldcr2007_Correa_en.pdf.
358
“Article 67 of the TRIPS Agreement sets out developed countries’ commitments on
technical cooperation. This Article provides that developed country members must
provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms and conditions, technical and financial
cooperation in favour of developing and least-developed country members to facilitate
TRIPs implementation. Such assistance can include assistance in drafting laws and
regulations to protect IPRs as well as the establishment or reinforcement of domestic
enforcement agencies.” Farhana Yamin, Globalisation and the International Governance
of Modern Biotechnology: IPRs, Biotechnology and Food Security, Foundation for
International Environmental
Law and Development 25, available at
http://www.sristi.org/mdpipr2004/other_readings/OR%2042.pdf.
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Bangladesh to gain technological and financial assistance from developed
countries on country-specific diseases.359
Further, Bangladesh should also avoid entering any agreements that limit
flexibilities allowed under the TRIPS Agreement or that could impose any
TRIPS-plus obligations.
F. Not to Agree on Any BITs or FTAs Eroding TRIPS Flexibilities or Imposing
TRIPS-Plus Obligations
The ability of LDCs like Bangladesh to utilize the flexibilities of the
TRIPS Agreement “is being slowly eroded away through various bilateral and
regional negotiations with developed countries.”360 High-income and
industrialized countries—more particularly the United States and the European
Union—put pressure on developing countries and LDCs to introduce TRIPSplus provisions, e.g., commitments beyond those specified by TRIPS and those
providing more extensive protection than TRIPS.361 “TRIPS-plus provisions are
introduced through bilateral agreements, such as free trade agreements (FTAs)
and investment treaties.”362 Between 2001 and 2010, “72 FTAs with intellectual
property clauses have been announced to the WTO. Of specific concern are the
FTAs between developed countries and markets, most notably the United States
and the European Union with low and middle income countries” because
extensive patent provision in the FTAs restricts utilization of TRIPS flexibilities
and hence present barriers to access of essential pharmaceuticals.363 More
recently serious concerns have been raised regarding The Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement (TPP)364 and Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement

359
During interviews, this was supported by IP academics, pharmaceutical researchers
and public health activists working in national and international NGOs having
involvement in the public-health sector in Bangladesh.
360
GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 187, at 49 (citing Miguel Ernesto Cortes
Gamba, Intellectual Property in the FTA: Impacts on Pharmaceutical Spending and
Access to Medicines in Colombia, IFARMA 37 (Oct. 2006), available at
http://www.ifarma.org/web/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/tlc_colombia_ingles1.pdf).
361
Peter Drahos, BITS and BIPS: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property 4 J. WORLD
INTELL.
PROP.
791,
800–01
(2001),
available
at
https://www.anu.edu.au/fellows/pdrahos/articles/pdfs/2001bitsandbips.pdf.
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GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 187, at 49; Drahos, supra note 361, at 802.
363
GLOBAL COMM’N ON HIV AND THE LAW, supra note 187, at 25; see also GOOD
PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 187; see also Susan K. Sell, TRIPS-Plus Free Trade
Agreements and Access to Medicines, 28 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 41 (2007).
364
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) is originally based on an
agreement originally concluded in 2005 between Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and
Singapore and now also negotiated between Australia, Malaysia, Peru, the United States,
and Vietnam. See Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting,
FTAS, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447, 454–61 (2011).
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(ACTA)365 due to the inclusion of TRIPS-plus patent provisions which may have
serious impacts on public health. LDCs like Bangladesh should be aware of the
various TRIPS-plus provisions that can have a negative impact on the use of
TRIPS Agreement flexibilities and subsequently on access to affordable
medicines. Below are some of the most common TRIPS-plus provisions related
to public health and access to medicines:
• Waiving the LDC exception as allowed under the TRIPS agreement366
• Defining “innovation” for the purposes of determining patent protection
to include minor “me-too” molecular variations
• Restricting patent oppositions
• Extending patent terms beyond 20 years for delayed marketing approval
• Limiting parallel imports of patented drugs
• Restricting grounds for compulsory licensing
• Imposing “data exclusivity” rules
• Linking patent systems to drug regulatory systems367

These TRIPS-plus provisions, if adopted by any developing countries and
LDCs, will outweigh the benefits of the TRIPS flexibilities for the country
concerned and will have severe consequences on access to medicines.368 The
pressure to adopt more extensive protection than required by the TRIPS

365

The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) is a multinational treaty, which
aims to establish an international intellectual property framework targeting primarily
counterfeit goods, generic medicines and copyright infringement on the Internet, and
would create a new governing body outside existing forums, such as the World Trade
Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization, or the United Nations. It has
yet to come into effect. ACTA has been criticized by Doctors Without Borders for
endangering access to medicines in developing countries. See A Blank Cheque for Abuse:
ACTA and Its Impact on Access to Medicines, MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES ACCESS
CAMPAIGN
(Feb.
17,
2012),
available
at
http://www.msfaccess.org/sites/default/files/MSF_assets/Access/Docs/Access_Briefing_
ACTABlankCheque_ENG_2012.pdf.
366
LDCs may need to adopt TRIPS-compliant national law including pharmaceutical
patents despite the fact that they are entitled to a transition period until January 1, 2016 to
fully implement patent protection for pharmaceuticals—and as per decision of June 2013,
have exemption until July 1, 2021 for general TRIPS obligations (which was July 1, 2013
earlier) and possibly have a separate extension for pharmaceutical patents even beyond
2021.
367
See Gaelle P. Krikorian & Dorota M. Szymkowiak, Intellectual Property Rights in
the Making: The Evolution of Intellectual Property Provisions in US Free Trade
Agreements and Access to Medicine, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 388 (2007); see also GOOD
PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 187.
368
Trading Away Health: How the U.S.’s Intellectual Property Demands for the
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Threaten Access to Medicines, MÉDECINS SANS
FRONTIÈRES ACCESS CAMPAIGN 12 (Aug. 2012), available at http://aids2012.msf.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/07/TPP-Issue-Brief-IAC-July2012.pdf.
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Agreement has also led to the debate over the floor versus ceiling in an
international IP regime.
Annette Kur and Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan argue that advancing the
concept of a ceiling for the TRIPS Agreement would protect flexibilities under
the TRIPS Agreement from encroachment by “IP maximalists.”369
[T]he concept of maximum rights or ‘ceiling rules’ which provide for a
binding maximum amount of IP protection that WTO Members can offer
in their national laws . . .[to] maintain a balanced approach towards IP
protection, and to protect members states’ autonomy in preserving public
policy goals vis-à-vis pressure exerted against them in bilateral trade
negotiations.370

According to them, TRIPS Art. 1:1 provides that:
[M]ore extensive protection may only be granted “provided that such
protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement.” In spite
of that, the general perception in international IP regulation so far has been
that above the prescribed minimum standards there is no ceiling or limit
other than the sky.371

On the other hand, J.H. Reichman stated that with the mandates, the
TRIPS Agreement established a floor for global IP norms.372 Reichman contends
that “states must accord to the nationals of other member states those
international minimum standards of intellectual property protection that are
comprised within ‘the treatment provided for in this Agreement.’”373 The U.S.
government and its industry lobbyists argue that the TRIPS Agreement should
not only be preserved as the “floor” for global standards, but that more attempts
need to be taken to strengthen the TRIPS Agreement and other agreements to
upgrade legal systems and enforcement mechanisms in the field of IP.374
To date, there is no debate at the WTO or other international bodies
regarding the introduction of ceiling or maximum protection restriction or any
proposal in support of it from the developing countries or the LDCs. In the
369
See Annette Kur & Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Enough is Enough: The Notion of
Binding Ceilings in International Intellectual Property Protection 44 (Max Planck
Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law, Research Paper Series No.
09-01, Dec. 8, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1326429.
370
Id. at 1.
371
Id.
372
See generally J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual
Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT’L L.
345 (1995).
373
Id. at 351.
374
See GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CENTER, TRIPS: FLOOR VERSUS CEILING? 4
(Jan.
26,
2010),
available
at
http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/sites/default/files/reports/documents/TRIPS_FloorVsC
eiling_WP_1_10_2.pdf.
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absence of any maximum limit, a country could frame its IP law based on its
comparative advantage in a specific (R&D-based) area of innovation or
imitation. Additionally, considering the importance of other societal values and
public goods beyond those of commercial interest as well as the country’s stage
of development, LDCs and developing countries may need distinct types of
ceilings. Any international binding regime on the ceiling, at least if placed
within the WTO, could potentially open the door for further complex legal
disputes under the WTO dispute settlement body and could further jeopardize
the process of ongoing policy space for access to medicines and other
developmental goals in the LDCs.
Therefore, LDCs such as Bangladesh need not adopt any ceiling on IPRs
at the national level, but instead can keep the space open to strengthen IPRs in
future if local industry matures and engages in innovation. Rather, Bangladesh
should try to avoid any TRIPS-plus obligations in free trade and investment
agreements with the United States, the European Union, or with any other
developed countries, and it may need to be aware of and try to mitigate TRIPSplus obligations in various bilateral and regional free trade or investment
agreements.375 While avoiding TRIPS-plus obligations will allow LDCs like
Bangladesh the freedom to utilize TRIPS flexibilities, LDCs including
Bangladesh could also lobby for further extension of the TRIPS waiver periods
in general and with pharmaceutical patent waivers in particular.
G. Lobby for the Extension of the Transition Period for Pharmaceutical Patents
Considering the vulnerable condition of LDCs due to their socioeconomic
conditions and weak public-health infrastructures, the introduction of
pharmaceutical patents will make LDCs more marginalized in terms of coping
with the prevailing situation. Bangladesh, in cooperation with other LDCs,
should consider lobbying for further extension of the transitional period for
pharmaceutical patents beyond 2016 (now beyond 2021 after the new extension
375

Since 2003, Bangladesh has been negotiating a Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement (TIFA) with the United States to include provisions on IP. It was finalized to
ratify in 2009 and revised further in 2012, but ratification was postponed by the
government of Bangladesh in consideration of possible negative campaigns in the
upcoming election. There is an assumption that proposed TIFA text could impose TRIPSplus obligations on Bangladesh. While request for disclosure of draft TIFA text for the
sake of avoiding controversies, an official of the U.S. mission in Dhaka said Washington
was not in a position to make the draft public before signing of the agreement. “There are
other drafts of TIFA and this one is similar to that,” said the U.S. official. See Khawaza
Main Uddin, Govt Inching Closer Towards Signing TIFA with US, BUSINESS INFO
BANGLADESH
(Nov.
7,
2009),
https://web.archive.org/web/20101120054050/http://bizbangladesh.com/business-news2758.php (accessed by searching for bizbangladesh.com/business-news-2758.php in the
Internet Archive index).
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decision on June 2013) so that it will have more time to develop its
infrastructure and its local pharmaceutical industry to deal with public-health
problems in a post-TRIPS setting. The Prime Minster of Bangladesh has argued
that it is necessary for LDCs like Bangladesh to receive another fifteen-year
extension based upon their weak infrastructure, vulnerable health conditions,
and the nascent stage of their pharmaceutical industries.376 During her
deliberation to the Sixty-fourth World Health Assembly (May 17, 2011), the
Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, reiterated that the flexibilities
accorded within the existing IP regime, in particular the patent waiver for LDCs
for pharmaceuticals, must be extended further.377
In this respect, Bangladesh could argue that the socioeconomic situation,
low level of development, and health and technical infrastructure for which the
transitional period was granted are still prevalent in LDCs; therefore, the
graduation to a pharmaceutical patent regime will have a huge negative impact
on Bangladesh.378 Unless there is considerable progress in the social and
economic development of the LDCs, growth of health infrastructure, and an
increase in the accessibility and availability of medicines, Bangladesh should
argue for the continuation of the waiver for pharmaceutical patents under the
principle of special and differential treatment for the derogation from
commitment.379
376

Sheikh Hasina, Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Speech to the Sixty-fourth World
Health
Assembly
(May
17,
2011),
(transcript
available
at
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/2011/wha64/sheikh_hasina_speech_20110517/en
/index.html).
377
Id.
378
To continue the transitional period until graduation to a higher level of social and
economic development and, hence,an ideal situation for the introduction of
pharmaceutical patents case by case or under a country-driven approach with recourse to
the WTO, Special and Differential Treatment may be sought. See Thomas Cottier, From
Progressive Liberalization to Progressive Regulation in WTO Law, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L.
779, 414–19 (2006).
379
Special and differential treatment (S&D) is a set of GATT provisions (GATT 1947,
Article XVIII) that exempts developing countries from the same strict trade rules and
disciplines of more industrialized countries. For example, in the Uruguay Round
Agreement on Agriculture, LDCs are exempt from any reduction commitments and
developing countries are given longer time periods to phase in export subsidy and tariff
reductions than the more industrialized countries. Using this principle, exemption from
introducing pharmaceutical patents may also be extended as long as problems of access
to pharmaceuticals and a low level of social and economic development persists in the
particular developing countries and LDCs. See, e.g., Javier Lopez Gonzalez et al., TRIPS
and Special & Differential Treatment – Revisiting the Case for Derogations in Applying
Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals in Developing Countries 17–34 (NCCR Trade
Regulation, Working Paper No. 2011/37 May 2011), available at
http://www.wti.org/fileadmin/user_upload/nccrtrade.ch/wp6/publications/wp_2011_37.pdf.
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On November 11, 2011, on behalf of the LDC group, the delegation of
Bangladesh to the WTO submitted to the TRIPS Council an elements paper on
the extension of the TRIPS transition period for LDCs, which mentioned that
LDCs are facing serious economic, financial, and administrative constraints on
their efforts to bring their domestic legal systems into conformity with the
TRIPS Agreement.380 This request was made to extend the transitional period for
implementing the TRIPS Agreement, which was scheduled to expire on July 1,
2013.
Accordingly, the TRIPS Council decision on June 11, 2013 extended not
only general TRIPS obligations but also obligations to introduce TRIPS
pharmaceutical patents until July 1, 2021. However, LDC members of the WTO
could make separate requests to extend the pharmaceutical patent waiver even
further. Ellen ‘t Hoen, former director of the Medicines Patent Pool and former
head of the Médicins Sans Frontières’ Campaign for Access to Essential
Medicines, remarked that:
LDCs [could] also ask for an extension for pharmaceuticals and data
protection closer to the 2016 deadline, they could ask for a longer
deadline than 2021 for pharmaceuticals, for example, until they have
‘graduated’ to developing country status, which is what they tried to do
for the entire TRIPS agreement.381

Most of the survey participants in Bangladesh argued that the government
of Bangladesh along with other LDCs should lobby for a further extension for
pharmaceutical patents until 2030 or until graduation from LDC category by a
particular LDC.382 The MNPCs that participated in the surveys argued that a
further extension of the waiver for pharmaceutical patents will not benefit
Bangladesh and, rather, will hamper the technological development and further
investment in the sector.383 In contrast, during the interview, one participant
argued that the local pharmaceutical sector in Bangladesh has yet to have
380

WTO COUNCIL FOR TRIPS, ELEMENTS PAPER ON THE EXTENSION OF THE
TRANSITION PERIOD UNDER ARTICLE 66.1 OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, IP/C/W/566 (Nov.
11,
2011),
available
at
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc
=s&source=web&cd=6&ved=0CEkQFjAF&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ip-watch.org%2
Fweblog%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2011%2F11%2FWTO-doc-W566.doc&ei=lv9c
U-33OKqdyQG_w4HgBg&usg=AFQjCNEEQe_k107vA2PV-_j20i4_tkeNjg&sig2=0K0
XkqPW_WKUWGzmnXcsTg&bvm=bv.65397613,d.aWc.
381
Catherine Saez, What Does WTO Extension For LDCs To Enforce IP Mean For
Pharmaceuticals?, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (Aug. 2, 2013, 11:45 AM),
http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/08/02/what-does-wto-extension-for-ldcs-to-enforce-ipmean-for-pharmaceuticals/ (emphasis added) (quoting Ellen ‘t Hoen).
382
This position was supported by all the large, medium, and small local
pharmaceutical companies in Bangladesh that participated in the survey.
383
During the survey, this position was supported by all the MNPCs operating in
Bangladesh.
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enough R&D to compete with the MNPCs; therefore, further extension will help
them to engage in R&D and prepare themselves for a transition to a
pharmaceutical patent regime.384 Further, one expert in the DPDT of Bangladesh
commented that considering technical and infrastructural limitations in the
DPDT, it would be better to have a transition period until 2030 for the
introduction of pharmaceutical patents.385 Therefore, Bangladesh should lobby
for a further extension of pharmaceutical patents considering its present stage of
technological capability and infrastructural development.
However, a simple extension of transitional periods without any concrete
steps to promote the advancement of the pharmaceutical industry would be
useless. Therefore, LDCs such as Bangladesh should use the transitional periods
as part of a national strategy aimed at encouraging pharmaceutical production
and investment in R&D based industry for progression towards innovation and
TRIPS compliance. One such strategy is to introduce process patent and utility
model law to encourage weak- or low-level national innovation and,
consequently, promote technological learning and progression on basic research.
H. Provision for Process Patent During Transitional Period and Adoption of a
Utility Model Law
Before adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, many countries provided only
process—but not product—patents because process patents would still allow for
the manufacture of patented products using a different process or method. This
has particularly enabled manufacturers in certain countries such as India to make
and become global suppliers of generic versions of patented.386
Despite having a long tradition of drug manufacturing, India’s then
applicable patent law (Patent Act of 1911) placed constraints on India’s ability
to use the full potential of its local industry. By introducing only process patents
along with other supporting industrial policies, India was able to dislodge the
MNPCs from their position of dominance and turn India into a major
pharmaceutical-producing nation. As stated by Sudip Chaudhuri:
A number of factors have contributed to the emergence of India as a major
pharmaceutical producing nation. Among these are:
 A tradition of development of process-technology by indigenous
enterprises;
 the externalities associated with the setting up of two major
public enterprises;
 the close association between manufacturers and government
laboratories; and
384

Interview with an expert at the Directorate of Drug Administration in Bangladesh,
in Dhaka, Bangl. (Jan. 12, 2012).
385
Interview with a deputy registrar at the Department of Patents, Designs and
Trademarks, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Jan. 22, 2012).
386
See World Health Org., supra note 98, at 238.
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the patent and industrial policies since the 1970s387

Because Bangladesh still follows the Patent Act of 1911 (which was
followed by India until 1970) the country should follow India’s footsteps by
introducing process patents and encouraging the local pharmaceutical industry
to invest in R&D. They could also work in cooperation with local research
institutions and Universities.
In addition to process patents, the government of Bangladesh could
introduce a utility model law. This could play a very important role in promoting
inventive and innovative activity not only in the pharmaceutical sector but also
emerging local industries in the fields of information technology, textile
manufacturing, telecommunications, and biotechnology. In Bangladesh, there
are many small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) including some
pharmaceutical companies with inventive ideas; however, they often do not file
patent applications due to the high cost of acquiring a patent, bureaucratic
hurdles, long delays in acquiring a patent, and lack of confidence in their ability
to satisfy high patentability requirements.
However, surveys show most of the local pharmaceutical companies
believe that a simple system that could grant protection quickly would help them
to quickly grow and further innovate.388 Again, bureaucratic delays and
expensive filings can be avoided if a simple system can be put into place. Such a
system with a broad scope could help in overcoming the lack of incentives for
inventions excluded from patent protection.389 It is important to require relative
novelty as opposed to absolute novelty for a utility model and also decrease the
amount of time it takes to review and grant patents, possibly five years.
Adopting relative novelty will ensure that the innovators get utility model
protection quickly by way of simple examination even if the patent application
contains only weak innovation—such as if there is at least one difference
between the invention and the prior art.
Therefore, a utility model law along with the introduction of process
patents should play an important role in filling the gap in law for promoting
local, albeit weak inventions while also encouraging them to further research
and innovation. However, it would be better for Bangladesh to introduce process
patents under the existing patent law and adopt a separate law on utility models
to encourage local innovation as local industries have yet to attain adequate
387
SUDIP CHAUDHURI, THE WTO AND INDIA’S PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 20 (2005).
See generally Sudip Chaudhuri, TRIPS and Changes in Pharmaceutical Patent Regime in
India (Indian Institute of Management 25–30 (Calcutta, Working Paper No 535, Jan.
2005), available at http://cdrwww.who.int/hiv/amds/IDA_India-Patent-amendmentsSudip.pdf.
388
Based on the survey data of local large, medium, and small pharmaceutical
companies in Bangladesh. However, MNPCs made no comments on this.
389
See UMA SUTHERSANEN, UTILITY M ODELS AND INNOVATION IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 5–7 (Feb. 2006), available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteipc20066_en.pdf.

No. 2]

Globalizing Standard of Patent Protection in WTO Law and Policy
Options for the LDCs: The Context of Bangladesh

483

technical capacities and lack financial resources for basic research and, hence,
for product patents as well. In addition to the process patent and utility model,
the government of Bangladesh could also consider introducing special
investment protection measures for the pharmaceutical industry to promote
further investment, joint venture, technology transfer, and basic research in the
pharmaceutical sector of Bangladesh.
I. Special Investment Protection Regime, Open Drug Innovation Model and
Promotion of “Social Businessˮ Model in the Pharmaceutical Sector
“There is a lack of new medicines for the ‘neglected diseases’—those that
primarily affect populations with little purchasing power, and therefore offer an
insufficient incentive for industry to invest in R&D.”390 That is why developing
countries and LDCs should devise a special investment regime to encourage
investment in research related to country-specific neglected diseases and also
could encourage local research institutions to join an open drug innovation
model in the absence of huge financial resources for basic research.Shamnad
Basheer proposed a comprehensive investment-protection regime based on the
compensatory liability model, which will grant comprehensive market
exclusivity for new drugs against free riders until such time as the investment in
the discovery and development of that drug is recouped and considering that it
could be more preferable to a patent regime.391 He further recommended a
reimbursement model, in which the costs of drug discovery and development
can be reimbursed through public funding and prizes.392 Unlike patents and data
exclusivity for uniform periods of protection, the proposed regime will reward a
rate of return on investment dependent inter alia on the health value of the
drug.393
However, Basheer stated that his proposed investment protection regime
is better suited to fostering cures for developed country diseases prevalent in the
United States and the European Union.394 Considering the huge cost for basic
research and drug development and minimal financial resources of consumers in
LDCs like Bangladesh, this kind of investment regime could be of little help to
generate investment in the LDC-specific diseases.

390

Suerie Moon et al., Innovation and Access to Medicines for Neglected Populations:
Could a Treaty Address a Broken Pharmaceutical R&D System?, 9 PLOS MED 1, 1
(2012).
391
See Shamnad Basheer, The Invention of an Investment Incentive for
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 15 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 305, 305 (2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2203440_code339749.pdf?abstractid
=2203440&mirid=1.
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Most of the developing countries and LDCs such as Bangladesh have
clearly different pharmaceutical demands than developed countries. “The
diseases of the poor attract very little R&D efforts by the large pharmaceutical
industry, since they are not promising income generators. R&D is driven by
market considerations. R&D targeting diseases found in developing countries is
marginal.”395
Despite the lack of patent protection for pharmaceuticals in Bangladesh
until the patent waiver periods for LDCs expire, the government of Bangladesh
could introduce a special investment-protection regime to encourage investment
and technology transfer in the pharmaceutical sector by providing “exclusive
marketing rights” for the same duration as patent. The government also could
provide tax incentives for a certain period of time. In this regard, Bangladesh
could set two preconditions for getting special investment protection: first,
investment and/or technology transfer in an area of neglected diseases or
diseases prevalent in Bangladesh and second, any drugs produced under the
investment or by way of technology transfer, if intended to offer in the local
market must satisfy requirements for licensing and market authorization by the
DGDA in Bangladesh.396
The government of Bangladesh could also encourage local research
institutions and pharmaceutical companies to engage themselves in the
development of a new open source drug innovation model and to participate in

395

Carlos Correa, TRIPS and R&D Incentives in the Pharmaceutical Sector 19
(Comm’n on Macroeconomics and Health, Working Paper No.WG2:11, Nov. 2011),
available
at
http://library.cphs.chula.ac.th/Ebooks/HealthCareFinancing/Working
Paper_WG2/WG2_11.pdf.
396
See generally WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, GLOBALIZATION AND ACCESS TO
DRUGS, HEALTH ECONOMICS AND DRUG SERIES 007 (Jan. 1999), available at
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/whozip35e/whozip35e.pdf.
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existing open source drug discovery models.397 Open source drug discovery
models are based on the idea that sharing medical information and international
collaboration among scientists will advance medical research and, ultimately,
will help patients all over the world suffering from neglected diseases.398 As an
example, Bangladesh could follow the Indian Open Source Drug Discovery
(OSDD) project to encourage research on the prevalent diseases in Bangladesh.
The Indian OSDD project is a collaborative online platform where contributors
can collectively discover new therapies for neglected diseases, which initially
focused on tuberculosis (TB) research. It was started in 2008 based on the $12
million in funding provided by the Indian Government along with a commitment
to invest $35 million total towards the project. Therefore, the government of
Bangladesh could provide some initial funding and encourage local research
institutions and pharmaceutical companies to form collaborative drug innovation
projects on country-specific diseases and later seek financial and technical
cooperation from international organizations such as WHO, UNIDO, MNPCs,
and transnational research institutions and funding from philanthropic
organizations such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Other open source
initiatives in the pharmaceutical sector such as the Tropical Diseases

397

Open source “is a way of sharing data, expertise, and resources to increase
collaboration, transparency, and cumulative public knowledge. It has been used in the
software field since its infancy half a century ago, and tried in the bio-pharma field over
the last decade.” HASSAN MASUM & RACHELLE HARRIS, OPEN SOURCE FOR NEGLECTED
DISEASES: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, CENTER FOR GLOBAL HEALTH R&D POLICY
ASSESSMENT
3
(Feb.
22,
2011),
available
at
http://healthresearchpolicy.org/sites/healthresearchpolicy.org/files/assessments/files/OS_f
or_NTDs_Consultation%20Draft.pdf. Additionally, a number of open source initiatives
have started in the medical field such as India’s Council of Scientific and Industrial
Research, which is working on open source drug discovery to develop drugs for the
treatment of drug-resistant tuberculosis. See COUNCIL OF SCIENTIFIC AND INDUS.
RESEARCH,
NMITLI
ACHIEVEMENTS,
available
at
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CEAQF
jAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.csir.res.in%2FExternal%2FHeads%2Fcollaborations%
2Fsa%2520old%2520new.pdf&ei=CcFOU7TLO9WsyASRpIL4Dg&usg=AFQjCNEkRe
HeI7eLQEjp046ICqlgNqcKtQ&sig2=HSlB_lx2j3rZ60LDaCSxNw. “In the long run, it
may help minimize duplication of effort, and create a ‘commons’ of knowledge and data
from which future innovation can grow.” MASUM & HARRIS, supra note 397, at 3.
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See Stephen M. Maurer et al., Finding Cures for Tropical Diseases: Is Open
Source an Answer?, 1 PLOS MED. 183 (2004).
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Initiative,399 TDR Targets,400 Collaborative Drug Discovery401 and The Lilly TB
Drug Discovery Initiative402 could also be examined by LDCs to gain an
understanding of their working procedures and then used to develop more
effective open source drug innovation projects targeting the health needs of the
LDCs.
Furthermore, LDCs such as Bangladesh could devise a different strategy
to encourage multinationals to invest in Bangladesh’s pharmaceutical sector
under the “social business model”403 as part of their social corporate
responsibility and humanitarian goals to help ensure that newly patented drugs
that are necessary but not produced by the Bangladeshi pharmaceutical
companies are available at affordable prices. This could be done either in
cooperation with local research institutions or through a joint venture with local
399

“The Tropical Diseases Initiative (TDI) modeled itself explicitly on open source
approaches as early as 2004 and produced a set of potential drug targets from pathogen
genomes that have been released under a Creative Commons license for further work.”
Hassan Masum & Rachelle Harris, Open Source for Neglected Diseases: Magic Bullet or
Mirage?, RESULTS FOR DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE 7 (2011), available at
http://r4d.org/sites/resultsfordevelopment.org/files/Open%20Source%20for%20Neglecte
d%20Diseases.pdf.
400
“TDR Targets is a WHO/TDR database that facilitates prioritization of potential
drug targets across tropical disease areas.” Id. It “brings together information on
genomics, structural data, inhibitors and targets, and druggability.” Id.
401
Collaborative Drug Discovery is a California-based company, which “has created a
platform for selective sharing of collaborative drug discovery data.” Id. at 6. “It allows
preclinical biological and chemical drug discovery data to be securely stored, shared,
analyzed, and collaborated upon through a web interface.” Id.
402
The Lilly TB Drug Discovery Initiative is a not-for-profit public-private
partnership headquartered in Seattle, Washington, with a mission to accelerate early-stage
drug discovery and help identify the tuberculosis drugs of the future. It has opened access
to its drug discovery expertise and scientific resources—such as its proprietary library of
500,000 compounds and innovative chemistry research tools—to be applied to the search
for new drugs to fight tuberculosis. See About the Initiative, THE LILLY TB DRUG
DISCOVERY INITIATIVE, http://www.tbdrugdiscovery.org/aboutinitiative.html (last visited
Mar. 17, 2014).
403
A social business is a non-loss, non-dividend company designed to address a social
objective. MUHAMMAD YUNUS, BUILDING SOCIAL BUSINESS: THE NEW KIND OF
CAPITALISM THAT SERVES HUMANITY’S MOST PRESSING NEEDS 1 (2010). In this type of
business organization, profits are used in a manner in which they may expand the
company’s reach and improve the product or service to a greater extent than a traditional
for-profit corporation, which is the reason why the investors receive no dividends or extra
payments apart from their initial investment. See MUHAMMAD YUNUS, CREATING A
WORLD WITHOUT POVERTY: SOCIAL BUSINESS AND THE FUTURE OF CAPITALISM 23–25
(2007). The main organizations promoting and incubating social businesses are the
Yunus Centre in Bangladesh and the Grameen Creative Lab in Germany. See
MUHAMMAD YUNUS, BUILDING SOCIAL BUSINESS: THE NEW KIND OF CAPITALISM THAT
SERVES HUMANITY’S MOST PRESSING NEEDS 154–58 (2010).
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pharmaceutical companies. The government of Bangladesh could provide
“special exclusive marketing rights” for pharmaceuticals produced under a
social business regime for a certain period of time in consultation with DGDA
and prospective investors. In deciding to grant this exclusivity, LDCs can
consider factors such as the nature of the investment, the necessity of the
medication, and the local demand, and the exclusivity can be conditioned on the
requirement that they maintain an adequate supply of the drug at an affordable
price.

CONCLUSION
This Article examined the possible options for legislative changes and
governmental interventions in developing countries and LDCs such as
Bangladesh in comparison to the options used in Brazil, India, and South Africa,
and it explained some of the drawbacks and limitations of existing patent laws.
Considering the limitations of patent law, this Article explored possible
governmental intervention options such as drug price control, national
competition law, patent prizes, patent pools, process utility patents, investment
protection regimes, and social business models that can be used to facilitate
access to medicines.
This Article, among others, also explored the option of lobbying to extend
the transitional periods for the introduction of pharmaceutical patents and
recommended that developing countries and LDCs reject BITS/FTAs that
contain TRIPS-plus provisions that result in the erosion of TRIPS flexibilities.
However, a country cannot gain substantial benefits from the extended
transitional periods or TRIPS flexibilities unless it has attained a certain level of
technological capacity and has developed a strong generic pharmaceutical
industry.404 Even a compulsory licensing mechanism will be of little use without
the technological capability to produce generic pharmaceuticals and a welldeveloped local pharmaceutical industry.405 Hence, the creation of sound
competitive market structures through competition law and enforcement could
be more effective in enhancing both access to medical technology and fostering
innovation in the pharmaceutical sector.406 It can serve as a corrective tool if
IPRs hinder competition and create a potential barrier to innovation and
access. 407 Again, while adopting a TRIPS-compliant patent law, LDCs need to
404
See Bryan Mercurio, Resolving the Public Health Crisis in the Developing World:
Problems and Barriers of Access to Essential Medicines, 5 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1,
40 (2006).
405
Id.
406
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, PROMOTING ACCESS TO MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES
AND INNOVATION : INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN PUBLIC HEALTH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND
TRADE
53
(2012),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/pamtiwhowipowtoweb13_e.pdf.
407
Id. at 14.
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ensure that their IP protection regimes do not run counter to their public health
policies and that they are consistent with and supportive of such policies.

